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ABSTRACT 
The Internet and the digital age create new challenges for copyright law. An 
issue which is contentious in the United States, but which has received little 
attention in the Commonwealth to date, is that of the appropriate level of 
liability for Bulletin Board System (BBS) operators whose subscribers commit 
copyright infringements. It is argued in this paper that they should not be 
subject to the strict liability of direct infringement, but should be judged against 
the standards of authorising an infringement, and secondary infringement. 
Three main areas are considered in order to support this view: 
(J) Which of the frameworks are conceptually most appropriate? 
The subscriber who uploads an unauthorised copy to a BBS provides the 
impetus for, and causes, breaches of the copyright holder's exclusive rights to 
copy the work, to show the work, and to issue copies of the work to the public, 
and so should be held directly liable for this. The BBS operator merely 
provides the means for this to take place - thus potentially authorising the 
infringement; and deals with the infringing copy - thus potentially secondarily 
infringing. 
(2) Analogies. 
The BBS should be viewed somewhat differently from traditional intermediaries 
and does not usually act as a publisher. BBSs are more readily compared to 
both photocopiers and distributors. These entities have the potential to be 
found liable for authorisation of infringement and secondary infringement 
respectively. 
(3) Policy. 
In addition, strong policy reasons exist for not holding BBS operators strictly 
liable. To expect BBS operators to screen every upload is totally unrealistic, 
and would result in much of the Internet's great potential for decentralisation, 
democratisation, and increased social discourse being lost. 
Finally, comments are made about which BBS situations should be found to 
satisfy the standards of authorisation of infringement and secondary 
infringement. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper comprises approximately 15 300 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We have the ability to make a perfect digital copy of text or images or 
multimedia, and to make it accessible instantly to millions of users . 
Despite the exciting ramifications, such technology can also constitute 
a license to steal another's property cheaply, easily and in a manner 
that destroys any incentive for future creativity. 1 
The digital age and the continually increasing use of the Internet2 bring new 
challenges for copyright law, which was developed in relation to print media. 3 
While the Internet can be of great benefit to copyright holders in allowing them 
to disseminate their works widely and possibly receive financial return from 
licensing or charging on a pay-per-view basis, it also constitutes a huge threat to 
their intellectual property rights. Whereas in the print world, copying by 
individuals does not constitute a great threat as copying is laborious and 
distribution is limited, digitisation makes copying far easier and of better quality, 
and the Internet makes distribution cheaper and far more effective. 4 Works 
which are in analog form5 can be digitised, and works which are already in 
digital form but protected from copying, 6 can be "hacked," and then made 
1 S Metalitz The National Information Infrastructure (1993) 13 Card Arts & Ent LJ 465. 472. 2 The Internet has been described as: 
.. . a collection of thousands of local, regional, and global Internet Protocol 
networks. What it means in practical terms is that millions of computers in 
schools. universities, corporations, and other organisations are tied together 
via telephone lines. The Internet enables users to share files, search for 
information, send electronic mail and log onto remote computers. But it 
isn't a program or even a particular computer resource. It remains only a 
means to link computer users together. Unlike on-line computer services 
such as CompuServe and America OnLine, no one runs the Internet... . 
No one pays for the Internet because the network itself doesn't exist as a 
separate entity. Instead various universities and organisations pay for the 
dedicated lines linking their computers. Individual users may pay an 
Internet provider for access to the Internet via its server. 
D Brunning "Along the lnfoBahn" Astronomy 23(6) (June 1995), 76. 3 M Ethan Katsh Jn A Digital World (Oxford University Press, New York, 1995), 220. 4 See JC Ginsburg "Putting Cars on the 'Information Superhighway': Authors, fa.1)loiters, and 
Copyright in Cyberspace" (1995) 95 Colurnb LR, 1466. 1488 (describing how Cyberspace has 
created an environment in which individuals can potentially do far more damage to copyright 
holders); N Elkin-Koren "Copyright Law and Social Dialogue on the Information 
Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright Liability of Bulletin Board Operators" (1995) 13 
Card Arts & Ent LJ 345, 383 (describing the ease of digital copying). 5 The term 'analog' is used throughout this paper as a contrast to the word 'digital.' 6 For instance computer software, or works which are only intended to be available to certain 
individuals, such as those who have paid to view the material . 
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accessible to huge numbers of people over the Internet, thus potentially 
diminishing greatly the number of legitimate purchasers of the work. 7 
Often, pursuing the individual responsible for an infringement may not prove 
fruitful for copyright holders. The individual infringer may be impossible to find 
or may not have the money to cover the damage done. For this reason, it may 
be asked whether liability should also extend to the operator of the Bulletin 
Board System (BBS) on which the unauthorised copy resides. 
BBSs vary in size from "small, privately operated bulletin boards" to "large, 
corporate, sponsored boards such as CompuServe, America Online, and 
Prodigy, which together have approximately 10 million subscribers. 118 They 
provide subscribers with a variety of information and services, which typically 
include a public message area, a conferencing area, e-mail service, and a file 
area. 9 The file area allows subscribers to upload 10 files and thus make them 
available for other subscribers to download. 11 While this capability can be used 
for innocuous and useful ends, it may also be used to disseminate unauthorised 
copies of copyrighted works. 
This paper examines the important issue of what level ofliability BBS operators 
should be held to for unauthorised copies uploaded by the subscribers.12 To 
date, very little Commonwealth literature exists on this point, which will have 
important ramifications for copyright holders, Internet users, and BBSs. Joseph 
Myers recognises that United States commentators and courts "have generally 
fallen into one of two groups."13 There are those who argue that BBS 
operators should be held strictly liable so that copyright holders are provided 
7 The dissemination of pirated software programs over the Internet and other computer 
networks is considered a serious problem in the United States. The computer software 
industry, which reportedly lost US$ 1.57 billion due to piracy in 1993, has organised a watch 
group to police the Internet and bulletin boards. K Tickle "The Vicarious Liability of 
Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement Occurring on their 
Bulletin Boards" (1995) 80 Iowa L Rev 391. 396. 
8 Above n 7, 395. 
9 Above n 7, 394-95. 
10 Uploading refers to sending messages or files to the bulletin board. Above n 7, 395. 11 Downloading refers to retrieving messages or files from the bulletin board. Above n 7, 395. 12 Trotter Hardy describes this issue as a "new" problem, meaning that it genuinely requires 
new consideration and debate as traditional copyright principles and policies cannot be adapted 
with only minor reconsideration. T Hardy "The Proper Legal Regime for 'Cyberspace'" ( 1994) 
55 U Pitt L Rev 993, 1002. 
13 N Myers "Speaking Frankly About Copyright Infringement on Computer Bulletin Boards: 
Lessons to be Learned from Frank Music, Netcom, and the White Paper" (1996) 49 Vand L 
Rev 439, 442. 
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with redress. Others believe that BBS operators should be judged by a standard 
which requires the BBS operator to have some degree of knowledge, arguing 
that forcing BBS operators to screen all postings may be an impossible duty to 
fulfil, given the vast amount of information flowing BBSs and the difficulty in 
determining whether material is infringing. The thesis of this paper is that BBS 
operators should not be considered direct infringers and thus subject to strict 
liability, but should instead be judged under the framework of 'contributory 
infringement,' 14 which has a knowledge element. This is more appropriate 
conceptually, when compared to traditional analogies, and from a policy point 
of view. 
Part I of this paper exarrunes the United States cases which deal with the 
liability of BBS operators for copyright infringements carried out by their 
subscribers. This will be useful for two reasons. First, it illustrates some of the 
different situations which might arise. Second, and more importantly, because 
the cases provide the only relevant jurisprudence on the area of BBS operator 
liability, they provide guidance on how BBS operators should be dealt with by 
New Zealand courts. The appropriate level of liability will then be analysed 
from three different angles. In Part II, the Copyright Act 1994 is applied to the 
BBS situation and it is argued that BBS operators do not meet the requirements 
of direct liability, but have the potential to be judged as authorisers of 
infringement, and contributory infringers, both of which require constructive 
knowledge. In Part III, BBSs are compared to some real space15 entities and it 
is argued that those which are somewhat analogous are judged by the same 
standards applied to BBS operators in Part II. Part IV argues that the 
authorising and secondary infringement frameworks are also most appropriate 
from a policy point of view, notwithstanding the contrary arguments from the 
United States Information Infrastructure Task Force that strict liability should 
be applied to BBS operators. Finally, Part V will consider more closely which 
BBS situations should be caught as authorising infringement or secondary 
infringement. 
14 Contributory infringement is applied situations in which the defendant does not directly 
carry out the infringing act, but in some way contributes to it. When used in a general sense in 
this paper. the term includes the American doctrine of contributory liability, and New 
Zealand's authorisation of infringement and secondary infringement provisions. 15 The term 'real space' is used in this paper to refer to the material world and is used in 
contrast to the world of cyberspace, see below n 16. Real space entities thus include traditional 
publishers, distributors, retail outlets and so on. 
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I UNITED STATES CASES DEALING WITH THE LIABILITY 
OF BBS OPERATORS FOR THE COPYRIGHT INFRINGING 
ACTS OF THEIR SUBSCRIBERS 
There is considerable controversy in the United States about how copyright law 
should apply to the cyberspace16 environment and about the appropriate level 
of liability for BBS operators. 17 The cases which have dealt with the issue have 
conflicted in a number of respects and it is not completely clear what the current 
position of the law is. 
This section will examine the cases against BBS operators for the copyright 
infringements of their subscribers. The United States Report of the Working 
Group on Intellectual Property Rights entitled "Intellectual Property and the 
National Information Infrastructure" 18 (the White Paper), will then be 
examined. 
A Playboy Enterprises, Inc v Frena19 
The Playboy case involved a claim against Frena, the operator of a BBS, by 
Playboy Enterprises Inc for infringement of their copyright. Various pictures 
from Playboy magazines had been uploaded by Frena's subscribers to his BBS, 
thus ma,a_ng them available to other subscribers of Frena's BBS. Frena claimed 
that he did not personally upload any of the infringing material, that he had no 
knowledge of the infringing material being available on his BBS, and that he did 
not intend to infringe Playboy's copyright. 
16 
Cyberspace is the realm of digital data. Its shores and rivers are the computer 
memories and telephone networks that connect computers all over the world. 
Cyberspace is a hidden universe behind the automatic teller machines, 
telephones, and WESTLA W tenninals which many of us take for granted. It 
is also a way for computer users all over the world to interact with each other 
instantaneously. 
DJ Loundy "E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems and Systems 
?frator Liability" (1993) 3 Alb LJ Sci & Tech 79, 81. 
1 See for example above n 13 (arguing BBS operators should be held strictly liable). 
Compare Elkin-Koren. above n 4 (arguing against strict liability for BBS operators). 18 Information Infrastructure Task Force "Intellectual Property and the National Information 
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights" (September 
1995, USA). 
19 839 F Supp 1552 (MD Fla 1993). 
6 
The court held that F rena had directly infringed both the plaintifPs distribution 
and public display rights. The court stated that Frena "supplied a product 
containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work" and that it was 
irrelevant that he did not personally make the copies20 and that he did not know 
of the infringement, as neither intent nor knowledge are elements of direct 
copyright infringement. 21 
B Sega Enterprises, Ltd v MAPHIA22 
In Sega, the court imposed a preliminary injunction against the operator of the 
MAPHIA bulletin board, holding that he was liable as a contributory infringer 
because subscribers to the BBS copied Sega video games off the BBS.23 
Because the defendant encouraged the copying by specifically soliciting the 
copying and expressing the desire that these games be uploaded onto the BBS 
to enable downloading, the court found that the test for contributory 
infringement was satisfied. 24 
The decision in Sega uses some language which suggests the court may have 
also found direct infringement for copying the video games.25 It is not clear 
upon which basis this finding was made.26 The court in Religious Technology 
Centre v Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Jnc27 interpreted this 
finding . as relating to direct infringement by the subscribers who uploaded or 
downloaded video games, reasoning that the Sega court was considering 
contributory infringement, and this requires the direct infringement of another.28 
C Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line Communication 
Services Inc29 
Netcom represents a major departure from the Playboy reasoning. Netcom 
concerned the liability ofNetcom, an on-line service provider, and Klemesrud, a 
20 Above n 19, 1556. 
21 Above n 19, 1559. 
22 30 USPQ 2d 1921 (ND Cal 1994). 
23 Above n 22, 1926. 
24 Above n 22, 1924. 
25 Above n 22, 686. 
26 See Elkin-Koren. above n 4. 363 (considering possible bases for the court's finding) . 
27 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal 1995; 33 IPR 132 (1995). 
28 Above n 27, IPR 142. 
29 Above n 27. 
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BBS operator, for unauthorised copies posted on their services without their 
knowledge. An individual named Erlich copied works relating to the Church of 
Scientology, in which the plaintiffs held copyright. Erlich transmitted the copies 
to Klemesrud's BBS, which briefly held the copies and then automatically 
retransmitted the copies to Netcorn, which in turn stored the copies temporarily 
and automatically retransmitted copies via the Internet to other BBSs. In this 
way copies of the copyrighted works were made available to a huge number of 
people. 
Unlike the court in Playboy, the Netcom court found neither Netcom nor 
Klemesrud to be direct infringers of the plaintiffs copyright. In both cases the 
infringing material was uploaded by subscribers rather than the BBS operators, 
but only the Netcom court found this fact relevant to its analysis. It found that 
the direct infringement framework was inappropriate because there was an 
absence of volition or causation on behalf of the BBS operators; they had not 
initiated the infringements and their systems acted automatically to copy the 
material and thus make it available to subscribers. 30 
The court also found that Klemesrud and Netcom were not vicariously liable. 
In the United States, the essential elements of vicarious liability for the actions 
of a primary infringer are that "the defendant ( 1) has the right and ability to 
control the infringer's acts and (2) receives a direct financial benefit from the 
infringement. 1131 The court held that while there was an issue as to whether 
Klemesrud and Netcom had the right and ability to control Erlich's conduct, the 
services received no direct benefit from handling the infringing works as they 
received only fixed fees for providing their services. 32 
In the United States, liability for contributory infringement will attach where the 
defendant, "with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another. 1133 In relation to the 
claim of contributory liability, the court held that the plaintiffs had an arguable 
case in relation only to work posted after the plaintiffs had alerted Klemesrud 
and Netcom of Erlich's infringing postings, as it was possible then that the 
30 Above n 27, IPR 139-144. 
31 Above n 27, IPR 147, citing Shapiro Bernstein & Co v HL Green Co 316 F 2d 304. 306 (2d 
Cir 1963). 
32 Above n 27, IPR 149. 
33 Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc 443 F 2d 1559 (2d Cir 
1971). 
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defendants knew or should have known of the infringing postings prior to 
notification, and arguably could have exercised control over Erlich's infringing 
conduct. 
D Reconciling N etcom and Playboy 
The Playboy and Netcom cases conflict in a fundamental way; the court in 
Playboy held the defendant BBS to the strict standard of direct liability, while 
the Netcom court judged its defendant BBS by the lesser standard of 
contributory liability. The Netcom court questioned the ruling in Playboy, 34 but 
purported to distinguish it on the basis that whereas Frena, the defendant BBS 
in Playboy, had been described as "supply[ing] a product," Netcom could not be 
so described, as, unlike Frena, it did not maintain an archive of its files for its 
users.35 Also, it did not "create or control the content of the information 
available to its subscribers. 1136 
However, it would appear that Netcom severely restricts the scope of Playboy 
rather than merely distinguishing it. The reasoning in Netcom is fundamentally 
opposed to the holding in Playboy. 37 Also, it would appear that the fact used 
by the Netcom court to distinguish Playboy, namely that Frena maintained an 
archive of files for its users,38 was not pivotal to the Playboy decision, and was 
not even mentioned in the court's reasoning on copyright infringement. The 
Netcom court questioned Playboy's finding of direct infringement, stating that it 
was "perhaps influenced by the fact that there was some evidence that 
defendants in fact knew of the infringing nature of the works, which were 
digitised photographs labelled 'Playboy' and 'Playmate. 11139 
E The Frank Music Settlement 
Commentators had hoped that the Frank Music40 litigation would clear up 
some of the uncertainties relating to copyright issues involving BBSs, but the 
parties settled out of court, thus precluding the court from ruling on these 
34 Above n 27, IPR 142-3. 
35 Above n 27, IPR 143 . 
36 Above n 27, IPR 143. 
37 See below. text at nn 74-93 .. 
38 It is not even clear exactly what the Netcom court meant by this. 
39 Above n 27, IPR 141. 
4o Frank Music Corp v CompuServe, Inc Civil Action No 93 Civ 8153 (SDNY 1993). 
9 
issues.41 The litigation concerned a music BBS, operated by CompuServe, 
which allowed subscribers to upload, browse and download digital copies of 
popular songs. Frank Music and the National Music Publishers Association, 
who held copyright in a number of the songs available on the BBS, sued 
CompuServe for its role in the copyright infringements occurring when their 
songs were uploaded or downloaded.42 
The settlement agreement included a licensing agreement which allows the 
music BBS to continue; provides for protection, licensing and royalty payments 
for the copyright owners; and specifies the level of liability which CompuServe 
will be held to, namely that actual knowledge is required for liability. 
F The White Paper 
This governmental report aimed to examine and analyse the intellectual property 
implications of the National Information Infrastructure43 and recommend 
changes to the current law where appropriate. 44 The report has received heavy 
criticism from some commentators who claim that it leans too far in favour of 
copyright holders. 45 
One of the issues considered by the White Paper was the level of liability which 
BBSs and on-line service providers should be held to for copyright 
infringements of their subscribers.46 The White Paper advocated that BBSs and 
41 Above n 13, 478. 
42 Above n 13, 478. 
43 The "National Information Infrastructure," as discussed in the White Paper. "encompasses 
digital, interactive services now available, such as the Internet, as well as those contemplated 
for the future ." Thus, its analysis and recommendations are applicable to the Internet, and 
indeed the White Paper for the most part discusses the issues in relation to the Internet as it is 
the currently functioning structure. Above n 18. 2. Conversely. the discussion in this paper is 
applicable to networks or services that are similar to the Internet. 
4~ Above n 18, 2. 
45 For example Pamela Samuelson argues that Working Group: 
depicts the changes to copyright law recommended in the White Paper as 
minor clarifications and updates to existing law. They are. in fact, a 
flagrant giveaway to the copyright industry, softened only by two public-
interest provisions added to make the package appear more balanced than it 
really is. 
P Samuelson "The Copyright Grab" Wired 4(1) January 1996, 134, 135-136. See also BD Rein 
"Edited Comments Concerning Managing Copyright Infringement in Electronic Fora" [ 1994] 
Ann Surv Am L 399, 400-40 l. 
46 See above n 18, 114-124. 
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on-line service providers should be held to a standard of strict liability, analysing 
them as direct infringers and arguing that while some contend that the liability 
level for BBSs should be lessened, policy considerations, which are referred to 
later in the paper, count against this.47 Because the White Paper was released 
after Playboy but prior to Netcom, the state of the law at that time was that 
BBS operators would be held directly liable. Thus no major law change was 
recommended in this area. 48 
It is debatable what the White Paper would have recommended on this issue had 
it been released after Netcom . Its comments about the appropriate liability level 
were not forcefully made, 49 and some flexibility was shown. 50 Also, its 
approach was to consider whether the status quo should be changed. 51 Had the 
status quo at the time been contributory liability as Netcom found, rather than 
strict liability due to Playboy, it is possible that the White Paper may not have 
been so convinced that strict liability was the most appropriate level as to 
recommend altering the law to change the Netcom position. 
47 Above n 18, 122-124. 
48 The White Paper does recommend altering the copyright holder's exclusive right of 
distribution to explicitly include transmission, and this change is included in the NII Copyright 
Protection Bill. The recommendation is, however. of little relevance to the discussion of this 
paper. as the change will not create a new right, but merely clarify an ambiguity in the present 
law by recognising that the distribution right can indeed be exercised by means of 
transmission. Above n 18, 213-214. See also Rein, above n 45, 402 (arguing that the 
recognition of a transmission right is superfluous). 
49 The White Paper recommended further discussion on the topic, noting that while 
it is not possible to identify a priori those circumstances or situations under 
which service providers should have reduced liability, .. .it is reasonable to 
assume that such situations should be identified through discussion and 
negotiation among the service providers, the content owners and the 
government. 
Above n 18, 123. 
50 The White Paper commented that "[n]o one rule may be appropriate," and noted that it was 
arguable that exemptions should exist when the infringing material is encrypted, or when an 
entity was in the position of a common carrier. Above n 18, 122. 
51 The e:-..1ent to which the White Paper was influenced by the status quo, and perhaps the 
extent to which it awaited developments in the area, can be illustrated by the following 
passage, which sums up its position on the issue: "The Working Party believes it is - at best -
premature to reduce the liability of any type of service provider in the NII environment." 
Above n 18, 122. 
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II THE CURRENT LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 
To date there have been no cases in New Zealand relating to the liability of 
BBSs for copyright-infringing material posted on their systems. In fact , there 
have been no cases in New Zealand relating to copyright infringement on the 
Internet at all. 
The BBS whose subscriber has uploaded an unauthorised copy could be dealt 
with in a number of different ways under current copyright law. Due to the 
peculiar way in which BBSs operate, it is debatable whether BBS operators in 
such a situation fall conceptually under the framework of direct infringement, 
authorisation of infringement, and/or secondary infringement. Each of these 
frameworks for treating BBSs have different requirements in order for liability 
to follow. 
A The Potential for BBS Operators to be Liable for Direct 
Infringement under the Copyright Act 1994 
When a subscriber uploads an unauthorised copy to a BBS, it is arguable that 
the BBS operator should be liable as a "direct" or "primary" infringer for its role 
in the infringement. 52 As the typical BBS automatically copies the uploading 
and makes it available to other subscribers to access, it is arguable that the BBS 
operator breaches at least some of the rights holder's exclusive rights. For 
instance there may be a breach of the right to copy the work (s 16(1}(a}}, to 
show the work in public (s 16(1)(e}}, to issue copies of the work to the public (s 
16(1)(b}}, and to include the work in a cable programme service (s 16(1)(t)). If 
the BBS operator is considered a direct infringer, his or her knowledge will be 
irrelevant as direct infringers are held strictly liable. 53 
In assessing whether the BBS operator should be held directly liable when a 
subscriber uploads an unauthorised copy, two issues need to be addressed. 
First, the question of whether this situation infringes any of the copyright 
52 See ss 29-34 of the Copyright Act 1994. The Act refers to primary infringement, but this 
term is commonly used interchangeably with direct infringement. See for example A Brown & 
A Grant The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, I 989), 
365. 
53 This can be contrasted to the position regarding secondary infringers, where some degree of 
knowledge is required. EP Skone James, J Mummery, JE Rayner & KM Garnett Copinger and 
Skone James on Copyright (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1991), 161. 
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holder's rights must be considered. Second, if there is infringement, it must be 
asked whether the BBS operator is the party who directly carries out the 
infringement. 
1 Are the copyright holder's rights infringed? 
A number of rights are potentially infringed in the BBS situation. These will be 
examined in turn. The following discussions illustrate some of the difficulties in 
applying copyright law principles, developed for the print world, to the 
cyberspace environment. 
(a) The right to copy the work (s 16(1)(a)) 
There is much controversy as to exactly what constitutes making a copy of a 
work in the digital context. In the United States case of MAI Sys Corp v Peak 
Computer Inc, 54 the court held that the creation of a temporary copy in a 
computer's "random access memory" (RAM) - which will disappear when the 
computer is switched off - does amount to a copy of the work being made. 
Under this finding, many copies are created when somebody uploads an 
unauthorised copy onto a BBS. Firstly, if the original work is converted into 
digital form ( for instance a written work is digitally scanned, or a musical work 
stored onto CD-Rom), the digital version created will be a copy of the 
original. 55 Then, when this copy is uploaded to a BBS, a copy is created in the 
storage system of the BBS.56 The ramification of the finding in MAI which 
causes most controversy, however, is that a subscriber who accesses the BBS 
and merely reads this copy will create a copy in the RAM of his or her 
computer, as the work must enter the computer's RAM to be displayed on the 
computer screen. 57 This result may be unsatisfactory as it means that even 
though the subscriber has not stored the work in a more permanent form, such 
as printing it out or saving it to hard drive or disc, the copyright holder's 
exclusive right to copy the work has been infringed by the act of merely 
bringing it up on the computer screen. Leslie Kurtz strongly questions this 
result, arguing that "[b ]ecause a work cannot be accessed on a computer 
54 991 F 2d 511 , 517-518 (9th Cir 1993 ). The case has subsequently been upheld in a number 
of cases. including Netcom. 
55 Above n 18, 65. 
56 Above n 18, 66 . 
57 Above n 18, 66. 
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without copies being made, copyright owners would have, for the first time, 
what Professor Jessica Litman has called an exclusive right to read. "58 Cathie 
Harrison and Susy Frankel recognise that merely accessing a copyrighted work 
is something people are free to do in a library or book store, and that this should 
not amount to unauthorised copying. 59 
Whether the reasoning in MAJ will be accepted in New Zealand remains to be 
seen. 
In New Zealand, copying a work is defined as "reproducing or recording the 
work in any material form; and [i]ncludes, in relation to a literary, dramatic, 
musical, or artistic work, storing the work in any medium by any means. 1160 It 
is arguable that merely transmitting a work to a computer's temporary memory 
is too transient or evanescent to be considered storing in a medium.61 
However, the court in MAJ found that the United States definition of making a 
copy was satisfied, and this, like the New Zealand definition, also refers to a 
'medium' and has a fixation requirement. Thus Brown's view that in New 
Zealand,"storing the work on a hard disk or even in transient form will be 
caught1162 is probably correct . 
(b) The right to show the work in public (s 16(1)(e)) 
The right to show the work in public has the potential to be activated in the 
BBS situation. Drawing on the metaphor contained in the name 'bulletin board,' 
the posting of a work to a BBS is similar to placing it on a real space bulletin 
board where people can view it, and so the right to show would seem to come 
into play. Indeed, the courts in Playboy and Netcom both found that the United 
States counterpart to the right to show copies -the right to display copies - had 
been breached.63 
58 LA Kurtz "Copyright and the National Information Infrastructure in the United States" 
~1996) 3 EIPR 120, 121. 
9 C Harrison & S Frankel "The Internet: Can Intellectual Property Laws Cope?" (1996) 1(3) 
NZIPJ 60, 62. On the other hand. the value of some works may not depend upon them being 
in more permanent or material form. If subscribers are able to read literature or databases, for 
example, they may not need to purchase them. Thus, even if subscribers do not store the work 
into more permanent form, the potential market for the work may decrease. 
60 Section 2 of the Copyright Act 1994. 
61 See above n 58, 122. 
62 A Brown "The new Copyright Legislation - An Analysis" Intellectual Property, Legal 
Research Foundation (Feb 1995), 13, 19 (emphasis added) . 
63 Above n 19, 1556-7; and above n 27, IPR 146. 
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Whether or not the subscribers to a particular BBS are a group sufficiently 
public in nature to satisfy the section may be an issue. Copyright law draws a 
distinction based on the character of the audience. 64 If an audience is domestic 
or quasi domestic, such as a small gathering of friends or family at an 
individual's home, it will not qualify as public. 65 In contrast, an audience will be 
classed as public if it consists of members of a club and their guests. 66 
In the cyberspace environment, the distinction between public and private is 
blurred. While it is reasonably clear that an individual corresponding with 
another person via e-mail is communicating privately, as the numbers involved 
in the communication increase, for instance where the communication is to a 
mailing-list,67 it becomes unclear exactly when the communication becomes 
public.68 Nevertheless, it would appear that in most situations, BBS subscribers 
would qualify as sufficiently public to satisfy the section. As Jane Ginsburg 
notes, "even acknowledging that cyberspace can promote a kind of friendship 
and perhaps even familial feeling among corespondents who do not otherwise 
know each other, the potential 'circle' of networked acquaintances is too 
capacious" not to be regarded as public.69 The court in Playboy classified the 
audience to the infringing postings as public, holding that while it was limited to 
subscribers, it did meet the United States test of consisting of "a substantial 
number of persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social 
acquaintances. 1170 
(c) The right to issue copies of the work to the public 
(s 16(1)(b)) 
The right to issue copies to the public would also appear to be breached when a 
subscriber uploads an unauthorised copy to a BBS as it is then made available 
to subscribers, but there is a conceptual difficulty. The way most BBSs operate, 
unlike the way in which distribution traditionally takes place in real space, does 
64 Australasian Performing Rights Association v Telstra Corporation Ltd (1994) 31 IPR 289. 
65 Duck v Bates (1884) 13 QBD 843; Jennings v Stephens [1936] Ch 469. 
66 Harms (Inc) Ltdv Martans Club Ltd [1927] I Ch 526. 
67 A mailing-list is "an e-mail address that is a macro for many e-mail addresses. Users send 
their mail to a single address. The mail thereupon is redirected to the list's subscribers, either 
directly or after a process of selection." Above, Elkin-Koren, n 4, 388. 
68 For a full discussion of the difficulties in applying the public/private distinction to the 
~berspace environment, see above Elkin-Koren, n 4, 390-9. 
Above, Ginsburg, n 4, 1480. 
70 Above n 19, 1557. 
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not involve the sending out of material to subscribers. Rather, subscribers are 
able to access the material on the computer on which the BBS operates. This 
fact sits somewhat uneasily with the concept of issuing copies. 71 However, s 9 
defines the right as "the act of putting into circulation copies not previously put 
into circulation." This seems to place the emphasis on the copies being made 
available, rather than being physically distributed, and would appear to 
accommodate the BBS situation. Again, the courts in Playboy and Netcom 
both found that the United States counterpart to the right to issue copies - the 
right to distribute copies - had been breached. 72 
(d) The right to include the work in a cable programme service 
(s 16(1)(1)) 
The definition of a cable programme service is provided by s 4 of the Act. A 
BBS would appear not to meet the definition. A BBS should qualify as an 
interactive transmission service, which is excluded from the definition of cable 
programme service bys 4(2)(a).73 
To sum up this section, it would appear that when an unauthorised copy is 
placed on a BBS, there will be breaches of the copyright holder's exclusive 
rights to copy the work, to show the work, and to issue copies to the public. 
2 Does the BBS operator carry out the infringement, or facilitate it? 
It should be noted at the outset that where BBS operators personally place 
unauthorised copies on their bulletin board, they will be directly liable. The 
following discussion concerns the less clear situation in which a subscriber 
uploads infringing material, potentially unbeknown to the BBS operator. 
In most cases, the BBS copies the infringing material and makes it available to 
other subscribers to access. However, as the subscriber initiates the process, 
and the BBS itself, rather than the BBS operator, automatically carries out the 
process, it is far from clear whether the BBS operator, the subscriber, or both, 
71 For a more complete discussion of the difficulties and implications of equating distribution 
with access. see above, Elkin-Koren. n 4, 387-89. 
72 Above n 19. 15567; and above n 27, IPR 146. 
73 Above n 59, 64. Cathy Harrison and Suzy Frankel consider in some depth whether the 
definition of a cable programme service includes the provision of a web page. They conclude 
that it would "in some circumstances but not in others." Above n 59, 63 . 
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should be considered the direct infringer. This uncertainty is reflected in the 
opposing views of commentators, and also the contrasting reasoning displayed 
by the United States courts. 
In the United States case of Playboy, the court described Frena, the BBS 
operator, as II suppl[ying] a product, 11 and thus directly liable for displaying 
infringing copies on the service and also directly liable for distributing 
unauthorised copies to its subscribers. 74 
This characterisation of the role of the BBS operator in the infringement can be 
contrasted to the way the defendant BBS operator's role was characterised in 
the United States Netcom case. In that case the court found the operator not 
directly liable, reasoning that: 75 
Netcom 76 did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in 
copying plaintiffs' works other than by installing and maintaining a 
system whereby software automaticall'f forwards messages received 
from its subscribers onto the Usenet, 7 and temporarily stores copies 
on its system. Netcom's actions, to the extent that they created a copy 
of plaintiffs' works, were necessary to have a working system for 
transmitting Usenet postings to and from the Internet. . .. neither 
Netcom nor Klemesrud initiated the copying. Thus ... the mere fact that 
Netcom's system incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiffs' 
works does not mean Netcom has caused the copying. 
The court similarly ruled that Netcom and Klemesrud were not directly liable 
for violating the rights to public distribution and display, reasoning that 11 [ o ]nly 
the [ uploading] subscriber should be liable for causing the distribution of 
plaintiffs' work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider are automatic 
74 Above n 19. 1559. 
75 Above n 27, IPR 139. 
76 Netcom was the on-line service provider which automatically received (and thus also 
automatically made the material available to its subscribers) the material from Klemesrud, a 
BBS operator. The Court stated that this reasoning applies equally to K.lemesrud. Above n 27, 
IPR 154. 
77 The Usenet is: 
a worldwide community of electronic BBSs that is closely associated with 
the Internet and \\ith the Internet Community ... .The messages in Usenet are 
organised into thousands of topical groups. or "Newsgroups" ... As a Usenet 
user, you read and contribute (post) to your local Usenet site. each Usenet 
site distributes its users' postings to other Usenet sites based on various 
implicit and explicit configuration settings, and in tum receives postings 
from other sites. 
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and indiscriminate. "78 In contrast to the Playboy court's characterisation of the 
defendant BBS's act as "supplying a product," the court in Netcom likened 
Netcom and Klemesrud to mere "conduits. 1179 
Which way New Zealand courts will rule on such an issue remains to be seen; 
whether they will conceptualise the actions of defendant BBSs as falling under 
the direct infringement framework or the secondary infringement framework. It 
is submitted that for a number of reasons, the Netcom approach is to be 
preferred. 
First, the Netcom case was far more fully reasoned on this point than Playboy. 
The Playboy court, without explanation, characterised the BBS operator as 
supplying a product, making the operator a direct infiinger and knowledge 
irrelevant. In contrast, the decision in Netcom is well-reasoned, and thoroughly 
considers the true nature of the operation of a BBS, as well as examining some 
policy reasons for not imposing strict liability. 
Second, Playboy's assessment ofFrena's role in the infringement as "supplying a 
product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work1180 can be 
criticised as simplistic81 and problematic.82 As Niva Elkin-Koren notes, it is an 
inadequate description of the BBS operator's role in the infringing activity. 83 
The court failed to examine in any detail the true nature of the way BBSs 
operate. 
When someone makes an unauthorised copy and disseminates it over a BBS, 
the BBS does not "initiate the unauthorized copying or communication; they 
simply provide[] the means by which another party [can] disseminate the 
infringement to the public. 1184 The BBS operator must take the active step of 
setting up the system which will automatically copy material placed on the 
78 Above n 27, IPR 142. 
79 Above n 27, IPR 143. 
80 Above n 19, 1559. 
81 See N Myers "Speaking Frankly About Copyright Infringement on Computer Bulletin 
Boards: Lessons to be Learned from Frank Music, Netcom, and the White Paper" (1996) 49 
Vand L Rev 439, 447. 
82 Elkin-Koren, above n 4. 361 (arguing that describing a BBS's operation as "supplying a 
iroduct" is awkward and confusing). 
3 Elkin-Koren. above o 356. 
84 Ginsburg, above n 4,1492. This discussion focuses on the type of BBS which appears in the 
caselaw and which is most commonly referred to in the literature on the subject. There may, 
however, be other methods of running a BBS to which this discussion does not apply. 
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system by subscribers and make it available to others. However, once this 
system is in place, a BBS operator plays no further active part in disseminating a 
subscriber's message. The operator does not need to make a conscious decision 
each time a subscriber uploads material about whether or not to allow it onto 
the system - the system operates automatically. The only control the operator 
retains is the overall control of being able to terminate a subscriber's access and 
ability to make postings. As Jane Ginsburg puts it, BBSs "provide the fora of 
communication. 1185 
As Kelly Tickle notes, the court in Playboy "did not recognize the bulletin 
board as a separately functioning entity," and treated the defendant BBS 
operator "as if he had personally made the photographs available to users, rather 
than the bulletin board. 1186 This is comparable to the owner of a photocopying 
machine who makes it available for public use being treated as personally 
making copies when people use the machine. 
In contrast, the Netcom court's analysis of the BBS operator's part in the 
infringement is sound. As David Dobbins argues, ""[i]f a user does upload or 
download copyrighted material, it is the user's uploading or downloading, not 
the operator's provision of a bulletin board, that is the primary cause of the 
violation of the copyright. The bulletin board is merely a tool by which the user 
infringes. 1187 Joseph Myers presents an opposing view, stating that the court in 
Netcom "ignored the role of the [BBS operator] in the infringement of RTC's 
[the plaintiff's] copyrights. 1188 He agrees that when infringing material is 
uploaded or downloaded, the subscriber who does this uploading or 
downloading, rather than the BBS operator, violates the copyright holder's 
reproduction right. Myers argues, however, that "it is simply underinclusive to 
claim that the subscribers' infringements of the reproduction right are the only 
direct infringements taking place, 1189 and that the public display and distribution 
rights are also violated in the BBS situation. Thus, he argues, the BBS operator 
should be held to directly infringe these rights. However, the arguments raised 
so far about the subscribers being the direct infringers are no less applicable 
here. The uploading subscriber initiates the public display and distribution; the 
85 Ginsburg, above n 4, 1492. 
86 Above n 7, 403 . 
87 MD Dobbins "Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users' Infringing Acts" 
~1995) 94 Mich L Rev 217, 223. 
8 Above n 13, 473 . 
89 Above n 13, 450. 
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BBS, while facilitating it, is only the means the subscriber uses. This was 
indeed the way the Netcom court ruled on the issue. 90 
Third, the scheme of the Copyright Act would indicate that BBS operators are 
best judged under the rubrics of secondary infringement and infringement 
authorisation. Because the Act is specifically structured to apply different 
criteria to direct, authorising, and secondary infringers, 91 it makes sense to 
analyse the uploading subscriber as the direct infringer and the BBS as the 
secondary infringer, as the uploader has initiated the infringement, while the 
BBS has provided the means. As Edward Cavazos and Chin Chao argue, 
"[h]olding [BBS operators] liable for direct infringement simply ignores the fact 
that someone else is using the bulletin board to conduct infringing activities. 1192 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, a BBS operator who personally 
places unauthorised copies on the bulletin board does infringe directly. The 
reasoning in Netcom would also appear not to apply to another BBS situation. 
Where BBS operators screen postings and decide which ones to allow onto 
their bulletin board, they do provide the impetus for further copying and 
dissemination, and so should be held directly liable. 93 
3 The innocent infringer provision - s 121(1) 
At first sight, it may appear that even if a court did hold a BBS operator directly 
liable, some relief may be provided for an unknowing BBS operator by s 
121 ( 1 ), which, in some circumstances, disentitles the plaintiff to damages, thus 
90 The court stated that holding a BBS operator directly liable for public display and 
distribution of a copyrighted work 
suffers from the same problem of causation as the reproduction argument. 
Only the subscriber should be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs 
work, as the contributing actions of the BBS provider are automatic and 
indiscriminate. 
Above n 27. IPR 143 . 
91 Although direct infringers and infringement authorisers are grouped together in the Act as 
'primary infringers,' these two categories are clearly separable due to the knowledge element 
r~uired for authorising infringement. 
92 EA Cavazos & GC Chao "System Operator Liability for a User's Copyright Infringement" 4 
Tex Intell Prop LJ 13, 16. 
93 In this situation, the BBS is acting as a publisher. For further discussion on this point, see 
below, texi at nn 122-133 . 
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limiting the claim to an account of profits. 94 However, it will be argued that 
this section will be of no use to a BBS operator. Section 121 (1) provides that : 
Where, in proceedings for infringement of copyright, it is proved or 
admitted that at the time of the infringement the defendant did not 
know, and had no reason to believe, that copyright existed in the work 
to which the proceedings relate, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages 
but, without prejudice to the award of any other remedy, is entitled to 
an account of profits . 
The provision is different to that which existed under the Copyright Act 1962, 95 
and, while Brown and Miles argue that the level of knowledge remains the 
same, 96 the scope of the section has been decreased in a way which is relevant 
to the BBS situation. The old provision exempted from damages a defendant 
who lacked the necessary knowledge that their act was an infringement of 
copyright, whereas the current provision exempts those who lacked knowledge 
that copyright existed in the work. 
At the recommendation of the Dalglish Committee, 97 the 1962 innocent 
infringer provision departed from its United Kingdom counterpart. The 
Committee felt that due to the United Kingdom provision's focus on whether 
copyright subsisted in the work, it would fail to protect a defendant who 
realised copyright subsisted in the work and sought to gain a licence to use it 
but obtained the licence from someone other than the actual copyright owner, 
thinking that this third party was the owner, perhaps because of a 
misrepresentation by this third party.98 
94 It is unclear exactly how an account of profits claim would be applied in a suit against a 
BBS operator for a subscriber's unauthorised uploading. as BBS's will usually not profit 
directly from infringing uploading. This is discussed more fully below, text at 176-178. 
9 5 Section 24(2) of the 1962 Act provided that: 
Where in an action for infringement of copyright it is proved or admitted-
a) That an infringement was committed; but 
b) That at the time of the infringement the defendant was not aware, and had no 
reasonable grounds for supposing, that it was an infringement of copyright-
the plaintiff shall not be entitled under this section to any damages against the 
defendant in respect of the infringement... 
96 A Brown & J Miles Update on Intellectual Property Reforms (NZLS Seminar, April 1995), 
17. 
97 1959 Report of the Copyright Committee. paras 340-47 and recommendations 52 and 53 . 
98 Above n 97, para 342. 
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With the introduction of the Copyright Act 1994, the provision reverts back to 
being equivalent to its United Kingdom counterpart, 99 which does indeed fail to 
apply to the situation envisaged by the Committee.100 BBS operators will 
effectively be in this position. They will assume that the copyright in works 
uploaded by their subscribers belongs to those subscribers, and that, by the act 
of uploading the works onto their system, they are granting permission for these 
works to be copied and made available over the BBS. When the true copyright 
owner claims for breach of copyright, s 121 ( 1) will afford no defence as the 
BBS did not mistakenly think that copyright did not exist in the work, but that 
there would be no breach. 
B The Potential for BBS Operators to be Liable for the Authorising of 
Infringement under the Copyright Act 1994 
By virtue of ss 16( 1 )(i) and 29 of the Copyright Act, authorising another person 
to do any of the restricted acts 1 O 1 constitutes primary infiingement of copyright. 
It is arguable that BBS operators should be liable for authorising the copyright 
infringing activities of their subscribers in some situations. 
Authorisation refers to "the grant or purported grant, which may be express or 
implied, 102 of the right to do the act complained of" 103 The type of 
authorisation which will be relevant for present purposes is where the means for 
infringement are provided. As Copinger and Skone James note, determining 
liability in these types of cases can sometimes cause difficulties. 104 The 
situation of copyright abuse over a BBS would appear to be one of these times. 
In the Australian case of University of New South Wales v Moorhouse, 105 the 
University was held to have authorised infringing copies made on its 
photocopier. The court stated that: 106 
99 Section 97(1) of the United Kingdom Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. 
lOO James Arnold & Co ltdv Miafern Ltd (1980] RPC 397. 
lOl The relevant restricted acts are described in ss 16(l)(a)-(f). 
102 U the alleged authorisation is implicit, the test is whether the relevant circumstances lead 
to an inference of authorisation. University of New South Wales v Moorhouse ( 1975) 6 ALR 
193 . 
103 CBS Songs ltdv Amstrad Consumer Electronics Pie (1988] AC 1013 (HL). 
104 Above n 53 , 220. 
105 (1975) 6 ALR 193; 133 CLR 1. 
I06 Above n 105, ALR 200-201. 
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a person who has under his [or her] control the means by which an 
infringement of copyright may be committed - such as a photocopying 
machine - and who makes it available to other persons, knowing, or 
having reason to suspect, that it is likely to be used for the purpose of 
committing an infringement, and omitting to take reasonable steps to 
limit its use to legitimate purposes, would authorize any infringement 
that resulted from its use. 
Because of a lack of adequate notices placed on machines informing users that 
machines were not to be used in such a way as to infiinge copyright and an 
absence of supervision of copying, the court held that the University had made a 
general implied authorisation to copy. In considering the level of knowledge 
required, the court held that the requirement that the authoriser must have 
knowledge, or reason to suspect, that the machine is likely to be used to infringe 
copyright did not necessitate the existence of knowledge or suspicion of the 
particular act. 107 Thus, knowledge in the general sense of realising the machine 
was likely to be used to make unauthorised copies was held to suffice. 108 
In many respects, as the Netcom court recognised, 109 the BBS operator is in a 
similar position to the owner of a photocopier who makes it available for public 
use. They both make available means which can be used to perfectly innocuous 
and useful ends, but which will also almost definitely be used by some to 
infringe copyright. It could be argued that most BBS operators would know 
that due to the potentially huge number of copyright infringements being 
committed on the Internet, the chances are high that some infringements will 
take place over their system. This general kind of knowledge of infringement, 
as opposed to knowing of particular abuses, was sufficient to satisfy the 
knowledge requirement in the Moorhouse case. So the knowledge requirement 
of authorising infringement will usually be met in the BBS situation. If, 
however, the BBS operator was not aware of the possibility of infringement 
over his or her system, because for example, the BBS was usually used only for 
a specific purpose which would not foreseeably involve copyright infringement, 
that operator should escape liability. 
107 Above n 105. ALR 201. 
108 The point was also made that a purpose of profit from the machines is not a requirement 
and is irrelevant to the existence of an implied invitation for users to copy as they see fit. 
Above n 105, ALR 209. 
109 Above n 27, IPR 139. 
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An element of authorising infiingement which may arguably allow BBSs to 
escape liability is that of control. The importance of this requirement is 
emphasised by the English case of CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer 
Electronics Pie, 110 in which the House of Lords held that a company which 
sold double-speed twin-tape cassette decks had not authorised the copying of 
pre-recorded works, as once it had sold the decks, it had no control over the 
manner of their use. 111 
BBSs do ultimately have control over their subscribers in that they can actually 
remove postings or cut off subscribers. However, in many instances they will 
not have practical control in terms of being able to monitor their subscribers' 
postings to find infiingements. However, the court in Moorhouse appeared 
unsympathetic to this difficulty of practicality of control, which existed for the 
owner of the photocopying machine also. Following this reasoning, it would 
appear that the potential to control will be sufficient. 
In refusing to find authorising infiingement, the courts in cases such as CBS 
Songs and others, 112 most notably the United States Sony case, 113 have 
emphasised that the machines that have been used to infiinge copyright also 
have substantial non-infiinging uses. Implicit in their reasoning is the concern 
that were copyright law to be too strict on suppliers of these products, the use 
of these legitimate products may be stifled.114 
Sony concerned a suit by holders of copyrights in films and television programs 
against a manufacturer of VCRs which could record programs off television, for 
the actions of its customers who used the VCRs to make infiinging copies. The 
Supreme Court quoted, with approval, this passage from the district court: 115 
Selling a staple article of commerce - e.g., a typewriter, a recorder, a 
camera, a photocopying machine - technically contributes to any 
infringing use subsequently made thereof, but this kind of 
llO Above n 103 . 
I I I The Court in Amstrad Consumer Electronics Pie v British Phonographic Industry Ltd 
p986] FSR 159 (CA), 207 held that there must be some power to permit the act or prevent it. 
12 See, for example above n 111 , 211 . 
113 Sony Corp of America v Universal Studios, Inc (1984) 464 US 417. 
114 For example, in Amstrad, Lord Templeman noted that recording machines. blank tapes 
and borrowed or purchased records "could be said to be 'materials which by their nature are 
almost inevitably to be used for the purpose of an infringement.' But lenders and sellers do not 
authorise infringing use." Above n 111, 204. 
115 Above n 113, 426, quoting Universal City Studio, Inc v Sony Corp of Am (1970) 480 F 
Supp 429, 461. 
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"contribution," if deemed sufficient as a basis for liability. would 
expand the theory beyond precedent and arguably beyond judicial 
management. ... Commerce would indeed be hampered if manufacturers 
of staple items were held liable as contributory infringers whenever 
they "constructively" knew that some purchasers on some occasions 
would use their product for a purpose which a court later deemed .... to 
be an infringement. 
Perhaps this principle of substantial non-infringing use is one of the reasons that 
Copinger and Skone James question whether Moorhouse would be decided the 
same way now.116 BBSs can clearly be seen as having substantial non-
infiinging uses - indeed the majority of communications and postings on BBSs 
will not infiinge copyright and the Internet is in general very useful and socially 
desirable. 117 The non-infiinging use cases are, however, distinguishable as the 
defendants had no ability to control the use of its products once they were sold. 
Perhaps what should be taken from the cases for present purposes is the policy 
principle that the sellers of staple articles of commerce, or, in this case, useful 
services, should not be overly inhibited because the things which they are selling 
can also be put to a use which infiinges copyright. 
If BBSs are held to qualify as potential infiingement authorisers, the duty this 
imposes may not be overly onerous. In the Moorhouse case, the court implied 
that the University would have escaped liability if it had put up a "clearly 
worded and accurate notice on each machine in a position where it could not be 
overlooked." 118 If this reasoning is followed, BBSs may simply have a duty to 
warn and educate their subscribers about copyright. 
C The Potential for BBS Operators to be Liable for Secondary 
Infringement under the Copyright Act 1994 
Unlike direct infiingement, the secondary infringement provisions requ1re 
knowledge in order for liability to follow. 119 
Section 36 of the Act provides that copyright will be infringed by possessing or 
dealing with an infiinging copy of a work. The BBS situation would appear to 
come within the factual requirements of the section. Where a BBS is run as a 
116 Above n 53 , 222. 
117 See below. tex1 at nn 190-204. 
118 Above n 105, 203 . 
119 See ss 35-39. 
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business, 120 the material held on a bulletin board can properly be described as 
being possessed in the course of a business (s 36(a)).121 Because material on a 
bulletin board is normally able to be accessed by many people, and because 
BBSs will often distribute material over Usenet, a BBS can also be described as 
exhibiting in public or distributing the material in the course of a business (s 
3 6( d)). If the BBS is not run as a business, then it may still be caught under s 
3 6( e) as distributing otherwise than in the course of a business to such an extent 
as to affect prejudicially the copyright owner. The crucial consideration, 
however, will be the knowledge requirement. 
Under s 36, an infringer must know or have reason to believe that the object 
they are dealing with is an infringing copy. It is not entirely clear exactly what 
situations this would cover. Clearly, actual knowledge would suffice, and 
probably some form of constructive knowledge. Part V will consider in more 
detail which situations may satisfy the knowledge requirement. 
m ARE ANY REAL SPACE ENTITIES ANALOGOUS TO BBSs? 
In attempting to determine what level of liability BBSs should be held to, 
commentators have suggested many real space entities as analogies. These 
entities range from publishers, which attract strict liability, to common carriers, 
which attract no liability for any copyright infringing goods they may be 
carrying. Perhaps the breadth of the analogies suggested gives some idea of the 
difficulty in applying to the digital environment copyright law principles which 
were developed for the print media. 
Several suggested analogies will be examined here. It will be argued that 
although the matches are not perfect, the owner of a photocopier available for 
public use and a distributor of information are the two best-fitting analogies and 
are useful to an analysis of the appropriate liability level of BBSs. The fact that 
these entities are not held directly liable but are subject to liability for 
authorising infringement and secondary infringement respectively, supports the 
analysis thus far. 
120 The Copyright Act provides little help in determining whether this is the case or not, s 2 
merely defining "business" as including a trade or profession. It would appear that where a 
BBS charges a subscription fee or sells advertising space, it would be run as a business. 
121 Indeed, the court in Netcom referred to a BBS operator possessing a digital copy on the 
BBS. See above n 27, IPR 142-143. 
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A BBS as an 'Electronic Publisher' or a Distributor? 
The White Paper states that 11 [ w ]ith respect to the allowance of uploading of 
material by their subscribers, [BBSs] are, in essence, acting as an electronic 
publisher [sic]. 11122 
However, it is submitted that this analysis misunderstands the true position of 
most BBSs. To analogise BBSs to publishers presupposes editorial control and 
an active role in publishing the material, two characteristics which most BBSs 
do not have. BBS operators do not generally select which postings they will 
allow on their board, edit them, or even monitor postings in any meaningful 
way. The role BBSs play in making the material available is qualitatively 
different from the role real space publishers play. Most BBSs merely provide 
the means for subscribers to upload and download files and material, rather than 
actively disseminating material. For these reasons, most BBSs should not be 
treated as analogous to publishers as they are far less responsible for the content 
on their systems. 
There may, however, be BBSs to whom the publisher analogy is applicable. 
BBS operators who do select which postings are made available on their board 
could arguably be treated similarly to real space publishers, because they are 
then responsible for what is on their board and provide the impetus for material 
being placed on their board.123 This idea that editorial control is an important 
factor in determining what level of liability BBS operators should be held to is 
reflected in the Cubby124 and Prodigy125 line of United States cases, which 
were decided in the slightly different context of defamation. 126 
122 Above n 18. 122. 
123 As mentioned previously, BBS operators will be held directly liable for unauthorised 
c~ies which they themselves post to their boards. See text at n 74. 
1 4 Cubby, Inc v CompuServe, Inc 776 F Supp 135 (SDNY 1991). For a more full discussion 
of this decision, the Prodigy decision. and of the United States law relating to defamation 
occurring on BBSs, see MC Sideritis "Defamation in Cyberspace: Reconciling Cubby, Inc v 
CompuServe, Inc and Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy Services Co (1996) 79 Marg L Rev 1065. 
125 Stratton Oakmont, Inc v Prodigy Services Co 1995 WL 323710 (NY Sup Ct May 24, 
1995). 
126 Edward Samuels notes that the issues involved in attempting to find the appropriate 
liability level for BBS operators for copyright infringement are different to those involved in 
considering the appropriate liability level for defamation. E Samuels "Copyright Concerns on 
the Information Superhighway" [1994] Ann Surv Am L 383, 392. Nevertheless, the 
defamation cases are instructive for the limited purpose for which they are being used here: to 
detennine in what situations BBSs could be considered to be exercising editorial control. 
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In Cubby, Inc v CompuServe, Inc, it was held that the defendant service 
provider was similar to a distributor rather than a publisher as it lacked editorial 
control over the content on its system, and so was not liable for defamatory 
comment placed there. 127 That case can be contrasted with the Stratton 
Oakmont v Prodigy Services Co case. In this case, Prodigy, an on-line service 
provider, was found to act as a publisher because it exercised sufficient editorial 
control over its boards. 128 The court found the situation to be distinguishable 
from that in Cubby for two reasons. First, Prodigy had marketed itself as 
controlling the content of its bulletin boards. 129 Second, Prodigy operated a 
screening program which automatically screened postings for offensive 
language, and issued guidelines which its Bulletin Board Leaders130 were 
required to enforce. 131 
While the principle expounded in Prodigy - that BBS operators may be treated 
similarly to publishers if they exercise editorial control - may be sound, it is 
arguable that the case was not decided correctly on its facts. Matthew Siderits 
argues that courts in future should examine the actual nature of the editorial 
control exercised and that an automatic offensive language screener such as that 
used by Prodigy should be considered insufficient to render it a publisher. 132 It 
is submitted that what should be considered is whether the BBS operator has 
the editorial control sufficient to put it in a position to judge content. Where 
this is the case, or where some limited form of control is exercised, such as 
occasional editing, BBS operators may more readily be found to qualify as 
secondary infringers as they may be more likely to satisfy the knowledge 
requirement. The actions of a BBS operator would only appear to circumvent 
the Netcom reasoning, and be judged direct when they exercise a discretion 
about whether or not postings should be allowed onto the board or be allowed 
to remain on the board. If this is the case, the impetus for a posting to go onto, 
or remain on, the board will come from the operator. 133 
127 Cubby, above n 124, 134-135. 
128 Above n 125, *3 
129 Above n 125 *4 
130 Bulletin B~d Leaders were people contracted by Prodigy to encourage use of the boards, 
and participate in on-line discussions. See Siderits, above n 124, 1077. 
131 Above n 125, *4. 
132 Siderits, above n 124. 1080. 
133 See above. text at n 93 . 
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B BBS Operator Compared to the Owner of a Photocopying Machine 
As previously discussed, the Netcom court likened the operator of a BBS to the 
owner of a photocopier who makes the copier available to the public. The 
court reasoned that because such a photocopier owner is judged under 
contributory liability rather than direct liability, the same should hold for BBS 
operators. 134 
It is arguable, however, that the analogy does not hold, for the following 
reason. When an individual uploads material to a BBS, the computer upon 
which the BBS runs automatically makes a copy of the upload, and retains this 
copy so that it can be accessed by other subscribers. This is arguably different 
from the operation of a photocopier, which does not make or retain an internal 
copy. Thus, it may be argued that where the material uploaded is an 
unauthorised copy, the BBS operator should be considered to have personally 
made an unauthorised copy of the work and thus be treated as a direct infringer. 
For the following reasons, however, it is submitted that the BBS situation is 
very similar to that of the owner of a photocopier, and that the differences 
which do exist should not make the operator directly liable 
Copies made in the operation of a BBS are actually similar in many important 
respects to those made in the operation of a photocopier. A photocopier and a 
BBS are both copy-creating mechanisms which are separate entities from their 
owner or operator respectively. In both situations it is an individual other than 
the BBS operator or photocopier owner who initiates the copying; the operator 
and owner take no positive steps in causing the individual copy. The fact that a 
BBS, unlike a photocopying machine, retains a copy of the work within its 
system does not mean it should be treated like a direct infringer. Instead, this 
point illustrates that the peculiar nature of the way a BBS functions means that 
134 The court stated that: 
The court believes that Netcom's act of designing or implementing a system 
that automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent 
through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine who lets the 
public make copies with it. Although some of the people using the machine 
may directly infringe copyrights, courts analyse the machine owner's 
liability under the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct 
infringement. 
Above n 27, IPR 139-140. 
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its operator should not only be considered a potential authoriser of infiingement 
like the owner of a photocopier, but, since, due to the operation of a BBS, it 
retains a copy and this is accessible to subscribers, the BBS operator should 
also be judged under the secondary infiingement provision of "dealing with" 
infiinging copies (s 36). 
It is also worth pointing out that the copies created by the bulletin board are 
often only created incidentally to allow the transference of data. Every time an 
upload or download is made, a copy is created by the bulletin board. As the 
court recognised in Netcom, if BBS operators were held directly liable for 
copying in this way, this would mean that even were a BBS operator to remove 
an infringing posting from the bulletin board straight away, it would already 
have infiinged due to this copy being made.135 For a BBS operator to look at 
uploads in order to be able to ensure that they do not infiinge copyrights, a 
copy will need to be created by the operation of the bulletin board. Thus, 
holding the operator directly liable for copies like this will lead to nonsensical 
results. 
Interestingly, no cases have found BBS operators liable for directly infringing 
the reproduction right. 136 In Playboy, the defendant BBS was held to have 
directly infiinged the distribution and public display rights, but not the 
reproduction right. 137 
C BBSs Considered Common Carriers 
Drawing on the fact that BBSs often act as passive conduits for information, it 
is arguable that BBSs or service providers should be treated as common carriers 
and therefore escape any liability for infiingements taking place on their 
systems. In the United States, certain analog entities, such as telephone and 
telegraph companies, are classified as common carriers.138 As Trotter Hardy 
explains, 139 
135 Above n 27 IPR 140 
136 Above n 21'. IPR 141-142. See also text at n 28. 
13 7 See above, text at on 19-21. 
138 There is no e>-.-plicit recognition of a common carrier doctrine in New Zealand, but in a 
sense it exists de facto, due to the fact that it is extremely unlikely that a New Zealand plaintiff 
would sue a telephone or telegraph company for copyright infringements carried upon its lines. 
139 Above n 12, 1004. 
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[a] common carrier has no choice but to carry messages and thus in a 
sense gains immunity from defamation, privacy, and copyright 
infringement claims in exchange for agreeing to provide service on the 
same terms to all members of the public. 
The White Paper, in its discussion of on-line service provider liability, indicated 
that it may be arguable for providers in some situations to claim common carrier 
status.140 In the Netcom case, Netcom's counsel argued that holding a Usenet 
server liable "would be like holding the owner of the highway, or at least the 
operator of a toll booth, liable for the criminal activities that occur on its 
roads."141 
While analogising a BBS to an electronic publisher is inappropriate in many 
situations as it overstates the amount of input to content that BBSs have, 
analogising them to common carriers understates their involvement. The 
Netcom court expressed some doubts about the analogy, stating that "Netcom 
does more than just 'provide the wire and conduits.111142 Common carriers are 
required not to have "any direct or indirect control over the content or selection 
of the primary transmission." 143 As previously discussed, BBSs, while often 
having little control, may exercise some limited control and, in any case, retain 
the ability to remove postings. A number of other characteristics of common 
carriers make the analogy inappropriate. BBSs and on-line service providers 
are not natural monopolies - on the contrary, there is much competition 
between them.144 Many BBSs do not market to the public generally - another 
characteristic of common carriers - tending to market themselves through other 
BBSs, if at all.145 Finally, finding on-line service providers or BBSs to be 
common carriers would subject them to a strict regulatory regime.146 This 
would be "wholly inappropriate for most smaller BBSs, and, with competition 
140 The Working Party stated that: 
If an entity provided only the wires and conduits - such as the telephone 
company. it would have a good argument for an exemption if it was truly in 
the same position as a common carrier and could not control who or what 
was on its system. 
Above n 18, 122. 
141 Above n 27, IPR 139. 
142 Above n 27, IPR 139. 
143 Above n 27, IPR 139. 
144 See Above n 12, 1004. This point was also recognised in Netcom, above n 27, IPR 139. 
145 Above n 12, 1004-5. 
146 AS Pink "Copyright Infringement Post Isoquantic Shift: Should Bulletin Board Services 
Be Liable?" (1995) 43 UCLA L Rev 587, 630. 
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as keen as it is, wholly unnecessary for even the largest commercial BBSs." 
Moreover, subjecting them to such a regime may restrict BBSs to such an 
extent that information flow will be slowed and expression will be chilled, the 
very effect that exempting BBSs as common carriers seeks to avoid_ 147 
D Analogising BBSs to Real Space Intermediaries 
It may argued that because BBSs are intermediaries, in that they play a role in 
allowing a creator ( or for that matter an unauthorised copier) to reach an 
audience, the way in which real space intermediaries are dealt with by copyright 
law should guide our treatment of BBSs. However, a number of factors mean 
that there is too much difference between real space and cyberspace 
intermediaries to let real space analogies determine the level of liability for 
BBSs. 
The role BBSs play as intermediaries in cyberspace is vastly different from the 
role intermediaries play in real space. This is caused by the nature of BBSs as 
conduits for information flow. Whereas in real space, due to costs and practical 
difficulties, creators are at the mercy of publishers, distributors and retailers if 
they wish to disseminate their works, creators in cyberspace need simply post 
their material on a BBS without fear of rejection. Intermediaries as they are 
now known will largely not exist in cyberspace, as works can be marketed 
directly to the end-user. 148 In sum, BBSs play a far less active and powerful 
role than real space intermediaries. 
Trotter Hardy identifies a further factor which makes existing copyright 
principles and policies relating to intermediaries in real space difficult to apply 
to BBS operators.149 There is some consistency between intermediaries of a 
particular type in real space in terms of size and scope. For example, most 
bookstores have comparable amounts of books, most record stores have a 
comparable number of records for sale.150 There is far greater variability 
147 Above n 146, 630. For discussion of the chilling of expression which strict liability would 
cause, see below, tex1 at nn 190-204. 
148 See Ginsburg. above n 4. 1477-1479. 
149 Although the factors are raised by Trotter in relation to the issue of defamation in 
cyberspace, they are equally applicable to the issue of copyright in showing the difficulties of 
analogising real space intermediaries to the position of BBSs. 
I SO Where a particular intermediary is dealing with a markedly different quantity of goods, it 
is likely to have a correspondingly greater or lesser number of staff to cope with the level of 
goods. Because works on a BBS are not dealt with physically, the number of staff involved in 
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among BBSs. The number and size of messages they carry, the amount these 
messages are monitored or created by their operators differs hugely, and so the 
practicalities of forcing BBSs to screen messages on their system will vary 
correspondingly. For example, while it would be virtually impossible for large 
BBSs like Prodigy and America OnLine to monitor every message passing 
through their systems, it may not be so onerous to impose such a duty on 
desktop BBSs which get only a few messages a day.151 
Apart from these conceptual difficulties and incongruencies, several separate, 
but closely linked policy reasons make the analogy between real space 
intermediaries and BBSs a poor one. These are discussed below.152 
IV POLICY CONSIDERATIONS - WHAT SHOULD THE 
APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF LIABILITY BE? 
It has been argued that BBS operators should not, and, most probably will not, 
be held to the strict standard of direct liability under the Copyright Act. They 
will instead be potentially judged as authorisers of infringement or secondary 
infringers, and either way, an element of knowledge must be shown before 
liability will flow. The real space entities which are somewhat analogous to 
BBSs are also not treated as direct infringers, so provide no reason to change 
this analysis. However, it must also be asked whether this is the appropriate 
level of liability for BBS operators in terms of policy. The White Paper and 
several commentators153 argue that BBSs should be held to a standard of strict 
liability. The issue has major ramifications for all involved. The following 
section will identify the interests which should be considered in determining 
which level of liability is appropriate from a policy viewpoint. Then the 
arguments of the White Paper and commentators will be examined. This will 
lead on to a speculative consideration of the probable repercussions of imposing 
strict liability as opposed to a less onerous level ofliability. 
the running of a particular BBS may not correspond to the number of messages. 
15l See above n 12, 1003. 
152 See below, tex1 at nn 164-177. 
153 See above n 13 . 
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A Factors to Balanced 
Copyright law is commonly referred to as being about finding the appropriate 
balance between copyright holders and the users of copyrighted works_ 15~ In 
the cyberspace environment, a couple of other considerations can be thrown 
into the mix. Patrice Lyons and James Dunstan urge us to also consider the 
development needs of the new technology. 155 This is a valid point, as overly 
vigorous regulation could indeed stifle development of the information 
superhighway, which promises to prove increasingly useful, provide powerful 
access to information, and revolutionise the way in which people 
communicate. 156 
Dianne Zimmerman argues for another important factor to be balanced when 
considering the appropriate level of copyright regulation of cyberspace: "the 
interest of the public in maintaining some approximation of our current cheap 
and simple access to copyrighted works for research, scholarship and 
pleasure." 157 Zimmerman suggests three factors which may dramatically alter 
the delicate balance between ownership and free use which copyright laws have 
struck in the past. She identifies a shift to electronic libraries, which may make 
real space libraries as we now know them obsolete; the fact that ( at least under 
current United States law) whenever a work is browsed on-line a copy is made 
and so the copyright holder's rights are brought into play; and the ability to use 
technolocks158 to control access to information. 
If real space libraries do indeed become less prevalent, these factors may 
contribute to an environment in which people wishing to browse through 
material for research or enjoyment in a similar manner to the way people 
154 See for example Samuelson. above n 45. 
155 JE Dunstan & P Lyons "Access to Digital Objects: A Communications Law Perspective" 
[1994) Ann Surv Am L 363, 363. Loftus Becker. Jr. warns of the gravity of the issue of the 
standard of liability for BBS operators, arguing that the standard "will not only directly affect 
the legal rights of some thousands of systems operators" but also "help determine whether 
computer bulletin boards continue to develop as a widespread alternative to the far more 
limited, traditional methods of communication." LE Becker, Jr. "The Liability of Computer 
Bulletin Board Operators for Defamation Posted by Others" (1989) 22 Conn L Rev 203, 205 . 
156 See below, text at nn 190-204. 
157 DL Zimmerman "Copyright in Cyberspace: Don't Throw out the Public Interest with the 
Bath Water" [1994) Ann Surv Am L 403, 405 . 
158 Technolocks allow copyright holders to control the access or use of their works. For 
instance, one type of technolock. digital encryption, makes work readable only by those 
possessing the digital right "key" to decode it. For a detailed examination of the various types 
oftechnolocks available, see above n 18, 183-189. 
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currently may browse in a library or bookshop, may face "cumbersome and 
unduly costly barriers," 159 thus inhibiting to some extent the "acquisition of 
information and happy chance encounters with illuminating ideas among the 
very audience for whom these works are created. 11160 While this point should 
not be over-emphasised, as the marketplace would most likely prevent costs 
from becoming too exorbitant, 161 it is nonetheless a valid concern and a factor 
to be balanced. 
B Arguments for BBSs to be Held Strictly Liable 
In its White Paper, released in September 1995, the Task Force enumerates 
some of the arguments made by BBS providers that liability should not be 
strict : 162 
... that the volume of material on a service provider's system is too large 
to monitor or screen; that even if a service provider is willing and able 
to monitor the material on its system, it cannot always identify 
infringing material; that failure to shield on-line service providers \\'i ll 
impair communication and availability of information; that exposure to 
liability for infringement will drive service providers out of business, 
causing the NII to fail ; and that the law should impose liability only on 
those who assume responsibility for the activities their subscribers 
(and, presumably, they) engage in on their system. 
While acknowledging that "[i]t is a difficult issue, with colorable issues on each 
side," the Task Force argue that strict liability is the appropriate standard for 
copyright infringements carried on BBSs. 163 The key arguments raised in the 
White Paper and by other commentators in favour of strict liability will be 
examined. It will be argued that, notwithstanding these arguments, strong 
counter-arguments mean that policy requires knowledge to be an element of 
infringement. 
159 Above n 157, 405. 
160 Above n 157 407 
161 Indeed, at p;esen~, virtual libraries like Westlaw and Lexis obtain licences from copyright 
holders (or their collective licensers) to allow their subscribers access. Their subscribers are 
then charged for time spent on-line rather than per article viewed. Often, substantial 
dispensation is allowed for universities to allow their students cheap or free access. This may 
well continue to happen as this form of library becomes more prevalent. There is also the 
potential for virtual libraries to charge a flat fee for access, or even state-funded virtual 
libraries allowing free use. 
162 Above n 18, 114. 
163 Above n 18, 114. 
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1 Real space intermediary analogies 
While the Task Force acknowledges that it may be impossible to screen 
everything placed on a particular BBS, it argues that other intermediaries in the 
analog world are also held strictly liable in situations in which it would also be 
impossible for them to screen everything.164 For instance, in the United States, 
photo developers, book sellers, record stores, news-stands and computer 
software retailers may be held strictly liable for distributing infringing copies, 
even where they have no knowledge of the infringement and even though it 
would be a near-impossibility for them to screen all the works they deal with. 
Trotter Hardy examines the policies behind the imposition of strict liability on 
analog intermediaries in the United States. He states that : 165 
[t]he no-scienter166 cases in copyright law appear to be justified by the 
underlying policy that ignorance of the law is no excuse: We do not 
want to encourage citizens to try to be "wilfully ignorant," and we do 
not want to face the exceedingly difficult task in litigation of separating 
"true" ignorance from "deliberate" ignorance. Implicit in this policy 
applied to copyright is the belief that "ignorant" copyright infringers 
should be made liable so that they will educate themselves and be on 
guard against the possibility that they may be infringing another's 
rights the next time. 
While these policies may hold true for intermediaries in the traditional print 
world, they are not so applicable to BBSs in cyberspace for the following 
reasons. 
First, the enormous volume of material flowing through many BBSs means that 
it is even more unrealistic to expect BBSs to screen messages on their system 
for copyright infringement than to expect screening by real space 
intermediaries. 167 Holding the owners of a nightclub or bar to a strict liability 
standard for infringements committed by bands they hire to perform is not 
overly onerous, as they will often know in a general sense whether the material 
being performed has a likelihood of infringing copyright and whether they 
therefore need to acquire a licence, which they can do easily and cheaply. 
Likewise, while it may be the case that such an owner may honestly not realise 
164 Above n 118. 116. 
165 Above n 12, 1006 (footnote omitted). 
166 A no-scienter offence is one for which knowledge is not an element. 
167 See below, tex1 at n 169. 
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the necessity of obtaining a licence, "once they know, they know," 168 so it 
makes sense to hold them strictly liable. In the absence of similar licences being 
available for BBS operators, there is no sense in fining BBS operators as a 
warning for next time as screening messages may be an impossibility, regardless 
of the operator's awareness and willingness. 
The examples the White Paper mentions of intermediaries held to a strict 
liability standard - photo developers, book sellers, record stores, news-stands 
and computer software retailers - provide better examples of intermediaries for 
whom monitoring for copyright abuses will often be extremely onerous. 
However, in many instances the volume of material these real space 
intermediaries will need to screen will not compare with the volume of material 
travelling through a BBS, nor the rate at which the material may be 
disseminated. To give an example which is not particularly out of the ordinary, 
one desktop BBS, run by an individual, carried, as of January 1994, 11 063 files 
available for its users to download, and held 45 782 e-mail messages. 169 As 
mentioned above, BBSs vary greatly, both in terms of the volume of material 
travelling through them and the manner in which they are run. This is a further 
factor counting against the imposition of a blanket strict liability standard for all 
BBSs. Several other factors also make screening more impractical for BBSs. 
First, book sellers, record stores and the like only need to screen for copyright 
infringements in their particular medium or genre - for example book sellers will 
be primarily concerned with infringements of literature and record stores with 
infringements of musical works. However, because of the range of different 
types of works possible on the Internet, including multi-media works, BBSs 
would need to be aware of the whole spectrum of fields in which copyright may 
exist . Also, most real space intermediaries play something of a "hands on" role 
in regards to their stock; they are physically dealing with the material and play a 
proactive role in making it available to the public. In contrast, many BBSs 
simply provide the fora for communication to take place. They may never even 
see the infringing material let alone read every word, and will play only a 
passive role in making it available. 
168 Above n 12, 1007. 
169 Above n 12, 1006, citing Kathleen Doler "Computers and Automation" Section Inv Bus 
Daily February 17, 1994, 4. 
37 
BBS operators face another problem which their real space counterparts do not: 
that infringing material may be encrypted. This means that it will be readable 
only by someone with the correct digital "key" to "decrypt" the work. A BBS 
without the correct key will be unable to check encrypted material short of 
"hacking" it. 
Apart from the difficulties of screening, there is also a difference between the 
reliability and likelihood of solvency of publishers which intermediaries deal 
with in real space as opposed to those dealt with by intermediaries in 
cyberspace. 170 In real space, bookstores, libraries and the like will mainly deal 
with reliable, known, and solvent publishers. This will mean that the aggrieved 
copyright holder will usually be able to identify the primary infringer, locate 
them, and receive redress from them, having no need to go after the 
intermediary. On the information superhighway on the other hand, it will often 
be far more difficult to gain redress from the actual infringer. This is because 
cyberspace "publishers" will often be individuals and may not be solvent. Also, 
in many cases they will use anonyrnous-remailers or provide false names and be 
impossible to track down. 171 
The argument advanced by the White Paper that BBSs should be held strictly 
liable like analog intermediaries clearly holds less weight in the New Zealand 
and Commonwealth context because of the different treatment of secondary 
infringers under the copyright law of these jurisdictions. In New Zealand most 
intermediaries are not held strictly liable. 172 In the usual chain of distribution, 
consisting of producer, wholesaler, and retailer, only the first act of putting into 
circulation copies not previously put into circulation will attract direct liability 
for issuing copies of a work to the public. 173 Thus, it would appear that only 
the original producer or importer will be directly liable. 174 Bookshops, music 
170 See above n 12, 1005. 
171 See above n 147, 629. 
172 One reason why intermediaries are dealt with more strictly in the United States may be the 
existence of a copyright registration system in that country. As Brown and Grant note, both 
the United Kingdom's Gregory Committee and New Zealand's Dalglish Committee (1959) gave 
the absence of such a system in their respective jurisdictions as the reason for the knowledge 
requirement. Above n 52, 369. Another reason may be the United States' desire to offer strong 
protection for copyright holders in general, no doubt influenced by the fact that in the United 
States intellectual property is a huge source of revenue domestically and internationally. 
Above n 147, 589. 
173 Section 16(l){b), as defined bys 9. 
174 This view is advanced in relation to the equivalent United Kingdom provision by Copinger 
and Skone James, above n 53 , 203, and in relation to the New Zealand provision by Brown and 
Miles, above n 96, 12. The view is supported by ss 9(l)(a) and 9(l)(c), which exclude acts of 
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stores and other retailers are dealt with as secondary infiingers, and thus will 
only be liable if they can be found to have known, or had reason to believe that 
they were dealing with an infiinging copy.175 There is some potential for the 
owners of clubs or bars to be treated as directly liable for the copyright 
infringements of bands they hire, 176 but they are usually classified as authorisers 
of infringement. 177 
2 BBSs "reap rewards" for copyright infringement 
The Task Force also argues in the White Paper that service providers "reap 
rewards for infringing activity." 178 This will not be true where BBSs charge no 
fee to their subscribers. When a fee is charged, the point is debatable. The 
BBS does not gain directly from activity which infiinges copyright, as the 
charge is a fixed fee and subsequent activity brings no further financial gain. 
However, the BBS may benefit in the indirect sense of gaining a greater number 
of subscriptions as people become aware of the possibility of obtaining 
copyrighted works, such as bootleg software. 
However, these concerns do not necessarily demand the imposition of strict 
liability. A lesser standard of liability, requiring constructive knowledge, may 
also catch many of the situations which should be caught. If a BBS is set up as 
a forum for the exchange of copyrighted works, the element of knowledge will 
be satisfied and liability will follow.179 Even where the BBS is not quite so 
proactive in encouraging illicit copying, but its system is more attractive to 
subscribers because of the availability of bootlegs, it may well be arguable that if 
this feature of the BBS was known to potential subscribers, the BBS operator 
subsequent distribution. sale. and importation from the definition of issuing to the public. Both 
commentators note, however, that even holding importers directly liable appears to conflict 
with s 35, which treats importers as secondary infringers and thus makes knowledge an 
element, Copinger and Skone James calling the result "anomalous and unduly harsh." Above 
n 53,203. 
17 5 Section 36 of the Act. 
176 In Australasian Performing Rights Association v Koolman the court found the owner of a 
club to have authorised infringement when a band played copyrighted music at his club. 
McGregor J indicated that he would also have been prepared to regard the club owner as 
directly breaching the public performance right. [1969] NZLR 273, 275. 
177 See above n 53, 220. 
178 Above n 18 117 
179 Sego Ente;prise~, Ltd v MAPHIA 30 USPQ 2d 1921 (ND Cal 1994). In that case the 
Court found the defendant BBS liable for contributory infringement, because he not only 
facilitated, but encouraged the copying. 
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also knew, or should have known. 180 Where the presence of infiinging material 
is such a minor part of the service that it is not a major attraction to subscribers, 
and does not indicate that the operator should have known of it, perhaps it is 
fair not to hold the operator liable. 
3 Contractual approach best promoted by strict liability 
Joseph Myers advocates a contractual approach to determining liability levels in 
particular situations, and argues that this is best promoted by a strict liability 
standard for BBS operators.181 Myers draws on Trotter Hardy's arguments 
that because BBSs present a new problem, and are diverse in terms of size and 
function, the ideal solution is to encourage interested parties, such as BBS 
operators, their subscribers, and copyright holders, to contract as to the liability 
appropriate in the particular situation.182 
Myers argues that having strict liability as the default rule will drive BBS 
operators to the bargaining table as they will "seek to contract around liability in 
order to continue to operate their systems. 11183 He cites the Frank Music 
settlement, 184 which provided for the copyright owners to receive licensing and 
royalty payments and CompuServe to be held to an actual knowledge standard 
of liability, as illustrative of this taking place. 
However, while it may be desirable to encourage individual parties to enter into 
such contracts, this does not necessitate a strict liability standard. Under a 
contributory liability standard, the parties in the Frank Music settlement would 
still have needed to reach an agreement in order for the music BBS in question 
to continue as it was; as soon as Frank Music and the National Music Publishers 
Association alerted CompuServe of the infringements, 185 CompuServe would 
180 For a more full discussion on the issue of whether BBSs profit from subscriber 
infringements in a slightly different context (that of whether BBSs satisfy the US vicarious 
liability's "direct financial benefit" test), see above n 7, 414; and Ginsburg, above n 4, 1494. In 
Netcom, the defendant BBSs were held not to have received a direct financial benefit as they 
charged a fixed fee and there was no evidence that infringing enhanced the value of services to 
subscriber or attracted new subscribers. Above n 6, 148-9. 
181 Above n 13 480 
182 Above n 12 '. 1043-1044. 
183 Above n 13 477 
184 See above, ;ext a~ nn 40-43. 
185 This may have been the case even earlier, if CompuServe should have known of the 
infringements at an earlier stage. 
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have been under a duty to investigate, and to remove the infringing postings_ 186 
For the infringements to remain on the BBS with CompuServe's knowledge, an 
agreement between the parties would still have been necessary. 
Moreover, while a contributory liability standard encourages BBS operators to 
contract in situations where this is desirable, like the situation in Frank Music, it 
does not impose liability in situations when such contracting out of strict liability 
would be impossible. When a BBS operator is made aware of infringements 
taking place over his or her system it makes sense to require the BBS operator 
to obtain the permission of the copyright holder in order to allow the 
infringements to remain on the system. It may also make sense when it is 
obvious due to the type of BBS that infringements against certain copyright 
owners are taking place. This may have been the case in Frank Music; the fact 
that the BBS was a forum for the exchange of digital copies of popular songs 
should arguably have put the operator on guard that infringements of music 
copyrights would be taking place, thus forcing an agreement with the music 
copyright holders. However, where the infringement is not known by the BBS 
operator and is not obvious due to the nature of the BBS or some other factor, 
the BBS operator is going to be unable to contract out of liability. For instance, 
it would be wholly unreasonable to hold the operator of, say, a BBS primarily 
concerned with gardening information which had an unauthorised copy of a new 
computer game on its system, strictly liable on the ground that the operator 
should have entered into a contract with the game's copyright holder. Such an 
approach would necessitate BBS operators entering into contracts with every 
copyright holder imaginable. 
4 A voiding a standard which promotes wilful blindness 
In the White Paper, the Task Force states that "[w]hether or not [BBSs] choose 
to reserve the right to control activities on their systems, they have that 
right." 187 It reasons that a level of liability less than strict may encourage 
intentional and wilful ignorance, as it would be in the interests of BBSs not to 
monitor their system so that the knowledge element of a lowered liability 
standard would not be met. 
186 Netcom, above n 27, IPR 145. 
187 Above n 18 122 , 
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To what extent wilful blindness is encouraged depends to a large extent on the 
level of knowledge required by the lower standard of liability, and is an 
important consideration in determining whether that standard is appropriate. It 
is argued in this paper that secondary infringement has an element of 
reasonableness. 188 As such it avoids promoting wilful ignorance, because BBS 
operators who fail to investigate when they should will not escape liability. 
5 BBS in best position to guard against infringement 
The White Paper also notes that between the on-line service provider and the 
copyright owner, the service provider is in a better position to prevent or stop 
infiingement.189 This is because the service provider has a business relationship 
with its subscribers and can warn and educate them, enter into indemnity 
agreements with them, and, even if only to an extremely limited extent, monitor 
its members' postings. This is probably the most persuasive argument the White 
Paper makes for strict liability, and leads to a consideration of the possible 
effects of applying a strict liability standard as opposed to a standard with a 
knowledge element, such as authorising infringement or secondary infringement. 
C The Potential Effects of the Level of Liability 
Clearly, there is much at stake for copyright holders in the level of liability 
imposed on BBSs. There is the potential for massive abuses of copyrights to 
occur over the Internet and, if BBSs are not held strictly liable, there may be no 
redress in many situations, as the actual primary infringers are insolvent or 
unidentifiable. As the White Paper argues, in many ways it makes sense to 
transfer this risk to BBS operators because they can at least have some control 
over postings on their system. 
1 Social and political costs of imposing liability 
However, as Niva Elkin-Koren warns, there may be great social and political 
costs in holding BB Ss strictly liable. 190 She argues that the decentralised nature 
of the Internet has great potential to aid democracy and increase the number of 
people involved in social and political dialogue, and fears that imposing too high 
188 See below. text at 217. 
189 Aboven 12, 117. 
190 See Elkin-Koren, above n 4, 399-407. 
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a level of liability on BBSs may hinder this potential and recreate the centralised 
nature of social and political dialogue of the analog world. 
At present, real space intermediaries such as publishers, broadcasters, and 
distributors, hold a great deal of power as they control people's access to 
channels of communication. 191 This is due to the fact that they govern the link 
between the creators of information and the users of that information. Power is 
thus centralised in these intermediaries, who can 11 select which works will be 
published and consequently the message that ultimately will be conveyed. 11 I 92 
This creates a bottleneck of information. Often economic considerations such 
as ratings or readership will influence the type of material reaching an audience. 
The Internet has the potential to change this power structure. Works of 
authorship can be made available directly to their audience, thus decentralising 
the power over information flow, diversifying the information available, and 
allowing more individuals to engage in public discourse. 193 Authors who may 
not have been published are able make their work available, and end users are 
able to actively select what they want to access. Thus, people with beliefs or 
interests different from the majority are able to receive and impart views and 
information which they would not have been able to in the print media. As 
Elkin-Koren notes, 11 [b]y weakening the role of intermediaries digitised 
dissemination causes private thoughts and public opinion to become more 
interconnected. 194 
This wonderful potential for democratisation, decentralisation, and increased 
social discourse, Elkin-Koren argues, will be greatly diminished if BBS 
operators are held to too harsh a standard of liability for unauthorised copies 
posted on their systems. 195 As BBS operators would want to avoid liability, 
they would be forced to monitor the messages on their systems, thus 
191 The importance of communication and social dialogue to society and individuals is 
elucidated by postrnodem scholars, who "emphasize the significance of dialogue over meaning 
as the essence of the human cultural being and the struggle over meaningmaking as the 
essence of political action in postmodemity." The ability to personally access and to control 
others' access to communication channels determines an individual's power to influence 
meaning. "The politics of meaning-making is a struggle to 'fix and transform meanings in a 
world where access to the means and the medium of communication is limited.'" Elkin-Koren, 
above n 4, 400. 
192 Elkin-Koren, above n 4, 40 l. 
193 See Elkin-Koren, above n 4, 402-3 . 
194 Elkin-Koren, above n 4. 403 . 
195 Elkin-Koren, above n 4, 404-7. 
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reproducing the information bottleneck. A centralised power structure would 
again arise as BBS operators edited and selected which messages to allow. 
Some BBSs would aim to decrease the cost of screening messages by limiting 
the postings they allow, for instance by limiting the number of subscribers able 
to upload, or more dramatically, by only posting information they have created 
or are licensed to use. People may be discouraged by the threat of copyright 
liability from continuing or beginning to run BBSs and this would lessen the 
channels of communication.196 Basically, in forcing BBS operators to weed 
out unauthorised copies available on their bulletin boards, an inevitable chilling 
of legitimate communication will occur. The Netcom court recognised this 
threat, noting that "[i]f Usenet servers were responsible for screening all 
messages coming through their systems, this could have a serious chilling effect 
on what some say may tum out to be the best public forum for free speech yet 
devised." 197 
The increased cost of monitoring messages faced by BBSs would presumably be 
transferred to subscribers in the form of increased fees. This would have the 
effect of dissuading some people from accessing BBSs and so decrease the 
potential pool of social communicators in cyberspace. 
Another possible outcome identified by Elkin-Koren is that BBSs may require 
copyright clearances before they allow works to be posted. 198 This would 
discourage postings and remove one of the strengths of the Internet - that it 
allows exchanges among people to be made instantly and with little effort. 
Whether the imposition of too high a level of liability on BBSs would lead to 
quite the dystopia Elkin-Koren predicts remains to be seen. In the United 
States, copyright law contains an innocent infringer provision, which allows 
reduction of damages for innocent infiingers. 199 Because of this innocent 
infringer provision, Karen Frank notes that if BBS operators follow up 
196 Above n 147. 631. 
197 Above n 27, IPR 149. 
198 Elkin-Koren, above n 4, 407. 
199 The United States Congress has stated that the provision "is sufficient to protect against 
unwarranted liability in cases of occasional or isolated innocent infringement, and it offers 
adequate insulation to users, such· as broadcasters and newspaper publishers, who are 
particularly vulnerable to this type of infringement suit," but, "by establishing a realistic floor 
for liability, the provision preserves its intended deterrent effect; and it would not allow an 
infringer to escape simply because the plaintiff had failed to disprove the defendant's claim of 
innocence." House Report, 163, reprinted in 1976 USCCAN, 5779. 
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complaints and remove obvious copyright abuses from their systems, they can at 
least avoid damages for wilful infringement. 200 In contrast, New Zealand's 
innocent infringer provision ( s 121 of the Copyright Act) would appear to be of 
little use to BBS operators if they were held to strict liability.201 The White 
Paper also notes that BBSs may be able to take out errors and omissions 
insurance policies to insure themselves against claims, or enter into 
indemnification and warranty agreements with their subscribers, or enter into 
licensing agreements. 202 The availability of these options may mean that 
imposing strict liability may not bring about such a fundamental change to the 
Internet as to force all BBSs to monitor all postings. However, it seems likely 
that a substantial number would be forced to monitor or decrease uploading and 
thus substantial effects of the kind Elkin-Koren warns against will still take 
place. 
If insurance, indemnity agreements, and licensing do mean that some BBSs are 
able to carry on running their systems in a manner similar to which they do now 
- with minimal monitoring of material on their systems - the implementation of 
these options would of course transfer extra cost to the subscribers, something 
to be avoided in itself from a policy point of view. Because some people would 
not be able to afford access, the democratising nature of the Internet would be 
reserved for the rich. Leslie Kurtz cautions that if copyright law's delicate 
balance between authors and users is tipped too far in favour of authors' rights, 
then the information superhighway, rather than fulfilling its potential of going 
some way towards evening out social, economic and geographical 
inequalities,203 may become a "toll road" leading to "an increasingly polarised 
society of information haves and have nots. 11204 
200 Karen S Frank "Potential Liability on the Net" 437 PLI/Pat 417. (Practicing Law Institute, 
Patents, Copyrights. Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series) (1996), 
'-f}lfe numbers unavailable on Westlaw database) . 
See above, text at nn 94-100. Presumably BBS operators who lacked knowledge would, 
however, avoid the award of any additional damages under s 121(2). 
202 Above n 18, 123. 
203 Bill Gates discusses this potential, noting that: 
one of the wonderful things about the information highway is that virtual 
equity is far easier to achieve than real world equity. It would take a 
massive amount of money to give every grammar school in every poor area 
the same library resources as the schools in Beverley Hills. However, 
when you put schools on-line they all get the same access to information, 
wherever it may be stored. We are all created equal in the virtual world, 
and we can use this equality to held address some of the sociological 
problems that society has yet to solve in the physical world. The network 
will not eliminate barriers of prejudice or inequality, but it will be a 
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D Striking the Appropriate Balance 
It is submitted that some sort of contributory liability, involving a constructive 
knowledge element, would best serve the competing interests involved in the 
issue of BBS liability. BBS operators would not be able to encourage 
infringements over their systems, would be forced to check up on claims of 
abuse on their systems, remove postings they knew to be infringing, and take 
active steps to educate their subscribers. 205 Copyright holders would thus have 
some redress in a number of situations206 and, if they find infringements taking 
place on a BBS, can notify the BBS operator and place him or her under a duty 
to investigate. While there will be a large number of infringements for which 
copyright owners will be unable to gain redress from BBSs, it must not be 
forgotten that they may sometimes be able to get redress from the actual 
infringer. Also, technolocks may provide some protection for copyrighted 
material on the Internet. 207 
Holding BBS operators to a contributory liability standard should also be seen 
to strike a reasonable balance from the point of view of the BBSs and those 
concerned with the stifling effect imposing strict liability may have on the social 
advantages of the Internet. It is preferable to a strict liability standard as, unlike 
strict liability, it recognises the reality of most BBSs - that it would be virtually 
impossible to monitor all postings. As such, while it may force BBS operators 
to modify the way they operate to some extent, it avoids a deleterious alteration 
to the power structure of cyberspace and a chilling of expression. A standard of 
contributory liability is best able to take into account the variability in size, 
scope and method of operation of BBSs;208 best addresses the relationship 
powerful force in that direction. 
Bill Gates The Road Ahead (Penguin Books. New York, 1995), 258-59. 
204 Above n 58 126 
205 Most co~enta~ors agree that this is a good thing. Even Elkin-Koren, who advocates a 
ve~ low level of regulation of BBSs agrees with this, above n 4, 410. 
20 This is preferable to what the situation would be if BBSs were treated like common 
carriers, because if this were the case. copyright holders would have no redress against BBSs at 
all. See above n 147. 632. 
207 See above n 18, 183-189. 
208 See above n 126, 391 (opining that the "correct" solution may allow for a range of 
outcomes, depending on the circumstances). 
46 
between the BBS and the subscriber; and best reflects the way BBSs 
operate. 209 
V A CLOSER EXAMINATION OF HOW THE RELEVANT LAW 
APPLIES TO BBS OPERATORS 
It has been argued that in New Zealand, the situation of a BBS operator whose 
system has carried infringing material uploaded by a subscriber should be judged 
under the rubrics of 'authorising infringement' and 'secondary infringement.' The 
strict liability of direct infringement is inappropriate, both conceptually and from 
a policy point of view. This section will examine in closer detail what 
implications the law of authorising infringement and secondary infringement will 
have for BBS operators and whether this law deals adequately with the BBS 
situation. 
If this paper's analyses of how the laws of authorising infringement and 
secondary infringement apply to BBS operators is accepted, these two laws will 
apply to the BBS situation in a complimentary fashion. To avoid being liable as 
an authorising infringer, BBS operators will need to take reasonable steps to 
educate and warn their subscribers about copyright infringement, and to avoid 
liability as secondary infringement, they will need to remove postings which 
they know, or have reason to believe, infringe copyright. 
A Authorising Infringement 
Applying the reasoning in Moorhouse to the BBS situation, it is suggested that 
in order to avoid being held liable for authorising the infringing acts of their 
subscribers, BBS operators will need to provide clear warnings210 to 
209 Elkin-Koren argues that: 
contributory infringement is more appropriate for dealing with BBS 
liabilitv, first. because it focuses attention on the BBS-user relationship and 
the w;y imposing liability on BBS operators may shape this relationship, 
and second because it better addresses the complexity of the relationships 
between BBS operators and subscribers. 
Above n 4. 363 . 
210 For example. in Moorhouse it was not sufficient that the University made a copy of the 
copyright legislation available in the photocopying room and issued library guides stating that 
users had responsibility to obey copyright law and informing them of the legislation's 
availability. The court held that the meaning of the legislation would be "obscure to the 
layman" and recommended instead a "clearly worded and accurate notice on each machine in a 
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subscribers that their board is not to be used to post infringing copies and that 
copyright will be infringed if this is done. 211 It will have to be made clear that 
the presence of material on the board does not mean that it is there with the 
copyright holder's permission, so subscribers should be wary about what they 
download, as downloading infringing material may also infringe copyright.212 
B Secondary Infringement 
The level of knowledge required for secondary liability will be crucial to 
determining liability for BBS operators. Section 36 of the Copyright Act 
specifies that someone infringes copyright in a work if that person "knows or 
has reason to believe" they are dealing with an infringing copy of the work. 
This standard differs from the knowledge standard in the former Copyright Act 
1962, which required actual knowledge, or notice of the necessary facts . 213 
The new knowledge standard for secondary infringement corresponds to that 
introduced into the United Kingdom by the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 
1988. 
Neither jurisdiction has fully tested the limits of the standard. Brown and Miles 
note simply that it "may have widened the circumstances in which infringing can 
be proved. 11214 Copinger and Skone James, writing in the United Kingdom 
context, observe that the new standard may perhaps "render liable a defendant 
who has negligently failed to make inquiry. 11215 The extent to which guidance 
as to how the knowledge standard applies to BBSs can be gained from the 
United States cases dealing with BBSs under contributory infringement is 
somewhat debatable, as the knowledge standard is arguably slightly different. It 
is submitted, however, that the difference between the United States 
risition where it could not be overlooked." Above n 105, ALR 203 
11 rn Moorhouse. it was held that in order to escape liability for authorising infringement, the 
owner of the photocopier should take reasonable steps to limit its use to legitimate purposes. A 
clear warning to users was suggested as sufficient. No more than this should be required in the 
case of a BBS, as it would arguably be even harder to monitor use. See above n 105, ALR 201-
203. 
212 Some may argue that this warning by BBS operators will be of little use to copyright 
holders as it will be ineffective in deterring subscribers from infringing copyright. However, 
while they will not stop subscribers who are determined to infringe, warnings of this kind may, 
over time, do something to decrease what Niva Elkin-Koren describes as the "public sense of 
lef.ttimacy with respect to digital copying." Above n 4, 384. 
2 JBM°"v Computer Imports Ltd [1989] 2 NZLR 395, 419. 
214 Above n 96. 14. 
215 Above n 53, 240. 
48 
requirement that the defendant "knew or should have known11216 and the New 
Zealand requirement of "knew or had reason to believe" is semantic only. Both 
standards would appear to involve an element of reasonableness, in that 
knowledge will be found where the defendant should have investigated_217 The 
United States cases will thus be fully relevant to determining which situations 
will satisfy the knowledge standard . 
1 Which BBS situations will satisfy the knowledge requirement? 
In the United States, liability for contributory infiingement will attach where the 
defendant, "with knowledge of the infiinging activity, induces, causes, or 
materially contributes to the infiinging conduct of another. 11218 The two 
fundamental elements of contributory infiingement are thus participation and 
knowledge. 219 
The Netcom and Sega cases provide much guidance as to when BBS operators 
will satisfy the knowledge requirement. In Netcom, the court held that the 
relevant time for determining whether the BBS has knowledge is when it 
provides its services which allow the subscriber to infiinge copyright. 220 
Netcom and Klemesrud were found not to have had knowledge or reason to 
know of the infiinging postings prior to being alerted of them by the copyright 
holders. The implication is that, in the absence of some factor which puts the 
BBS operator on guard of an infiingement, knowledge will not be inferred. 
Also, the court's reasoning means that there is no general duty on a BBS to 
screen all postings for copyright infiingements. 
The court found that there was an arguable case, however, that the defendant 
BBSs should have known of infiingements posted by Erlich following receipt of 
the plaintifrs letter demanding that Erlich be kept off their respective 
systems. 221 
216 Above 27, IPR207. 
217 Some support for the New Zealand standard having an element of reasonableness is 
provided by Golden Editions Pty Ltd v Po~vgram Pty Ltd (1995) 34 IPR 84 . The defendant 
was found not to have satisfied the Australian innocent infringement provision's knowledge 
requirement of not being aware, and having no reasonable grounds for suspecting, as the 
circumstances were such that he should have investigated. 
218 Gershwin Publishing Corp v Columbia Artists Management Inc 443 F 2d 1559 (2d Cir 
1971 ). 
219 Above n 147. 621. 
220 Above n 27, IPR 145. 
221 The court stated that: 
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So, once a copyright holder alerts a BBS operator of an infringing copy on his 
or her system, the BBS is put under a duty to investigate. This would appear to 
be a fair balancing of the interests involved, as the factor which makes it so hard 
for BBS operators to discard infringing copies is a lack of knowledge. Once 
they are placed in a position to be able to find out and act to stop an 
infringement, they should have a duty to do so. 
The Netcom court analysed the requirements of the notice given by the 
copyright holder to the BBS operator. It stated that "a mere unsupported 
allegation of infringement by a copyright owner may not automatically put a 
defendant on notice of infringing activity," but the argument "that liability must 
be unequivocal is unsupportable. "222 The BBS operator thus has a duty to 
determine the truth of the copyright holder's claim, regardless of the type of 
material posted.223 
Under the reasoning m Sega, where BBS operators actually encourage 
infringing activity, they will rightly be caught as contributory infringers. As the 
court stated, "[e]ven if [the defendants] do not know exactly when games will 
be uploaded to or downloaded from [their] bulletin board, their role in the 
copymg, including proV1s1on of facilities, direction, knowledge and 
encouragement, amount to contributory infiingement. 11224 
The Netcom and Sega cases thus provide guidance on how the knowledge 
requirement will apply to BBSs in some situations. However, the limits of any 
duty to investigate are still far from tested, and there is a lack of consensus 
among commentators as to what the limits should be. 225 
[i]f plaintiff can prove the knowledge element. Netcom will be liable for 
contributory infringement since its failure to simply cancel Erlich's 
infringing message and thereby stop an infringing copy from being 
distributed worldwide constitutes substantial participation in Erlich's public 
distribution of the message. 
Above n 27, IPR 145. 
222 Above n 27. IPR 145. 
223 Above n 27. IPR 145 (noting that the fact that the material in question was written 
material, as opposed to software - which BBS operators are better able to judge whether it is 
infringing or not - is immaterial). 
224 Above n 22, 1924. 
225 Compare the contrasting approaches of above n 147 (arguing that contributory liability 
should impose a heavy duty on BBS operators to prevent direct infringement by subscribers); 
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The reasonableness aspect of the knowledge requirement will allow courts to 
take into account variances in BBS operator's situations. It is preferable to an 
actual knowledge standard, as wilful ignorance will not be encouraged, because 
where BBS operators should have investigated, they will have the requisite 
knowledge. 
Given that the suggestion in this paper as to how the BBS situation should be 
analysed has yet to be tested in a Commonwealth court, it would be premature 
to attempt to fully demarcate the limits of the knowledge requirement as it 
applies to BBS operators and any duty it places upon them to check their 
board's content. Such limits are best developed by the courts on a case by case 
basis. Nonetheless, general comments will be made about two areas which are 
likely to be contentious: whether a BBS operator will be imputed with 
constructive knowledge of the contents of his or her board where it is not 
impractical to screen uploads, and whether an operator's general knowledge 
that unauthorised copies may be rife on his or her board will satisfy the 
knowledge standard. 
2 A duty to screen based upon the practicality of doing so? 
It is implicit in the Netcom reasoning that the court did not advocate any general 
duty on the part of BBS operators to screen every upload. This is rightly so, 
given the sheer volume of information travelling through most BBSs. 
However, perhaps it is reasonable for the operator of a smaller BBS to check all 
uploads when it would not be impractical to do so. Cathie Harrison and Susy 
Frankel argue that :226 
[l]iability should depend, it is submitted, on the extent to which the 
system operator or access provider could realistically be expected to 
monitor what is placed on a particular site or transmitted across the 
net. If that party cannot realistically exercise a form of editorial 
control, it is quite artificial (and quite counter-productive) to impose 
liability on that party. 
above n 87 (arguing for a duty of periodic monitoring): and KM Cox "Online Service Providers 
and Copyright Law: The Need for Change" ( 1995) l Syracuse J Legis & Pol'y 197 (arguing 
that BBS operators should only be liable when they have actual knowledge). 
226 Above n 59, 62. 
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The problem with imposing a duty on operators to screen their boards where it 
would not be completely impractical to do so is that operators of small desktop 
BBSs may face the burden of being under such a duty, while large commercial 
BBSs would escape responsibility to screen. This would be antithetical to the 
argument raised in this paper that the Internet aids decentralisation and 
individual involvement in social discourse. 227 
A suggestion made by David Dobbins may alleviate this unjust situation. 
Dobbins argues that BBS operators should be under a duty to periodically 
monitor the content of their boards. 228 Such a requirement would impose a 
similar burden on all operators, and would strike a reasonable balance between 
the competing interests; it would not be unreasonably onerous on operators and 
would provide some protection to copyright holders and preclude BBS 
operators from turning a blind eye. 
3 A duty to screen based upon the manner of the bulletin board? 
Another debatable point is whether BBS operators who have special reason to 
think that infringements could be taking place on their boards will be found to 
have sufficient knowledge. An example of this would be where the nature of 
the bulletin board makes it particularly susceptible to uploads of unauthorised 
227 Many operators of small BBSs may still be able to argue that it would be unreasonable to 
e~ them to screen every upload. 
2 Above n 87, 237. Dobbins suggests that courts, in determining whether knowledge should 
be imputed to a BBS operator. should apply several non-exhaustive. fact-based tests: 
1. How many infringing items were present on the board? If many items on 
the board contained infringing material. an operator should have been aware 
that users were abusing the board. 2. How long had the infringing material 
been on the board? The longer material had been on the board the more 
courts should infer that the operator knew it was there. 3. What was the 
nature of the infringing item? If the item is the newest version of a popular 
software product or clearly marked as the intellectual property of the 
copyright holder. it would be relatively easy for the operator to determine 
the infringing nature of the item. It is highly unlikely, for example. that 
Microsoft would wish to distribute Windows '95 for free over the Internet 
while at the same time trying to sell it in stores. 4. Was it possible for the 
operator to know of the infringement? Some sophisticated hackers are able 
to camouflage their use of an innocent operator's bulletin board. In this 
situation, the bulletin board has no reasonable means to discover the 
infringing use, and the knowledge element of contributory copyright 
infringement would therefore be missing. 
Above n 87. 237-38. 
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copies. This could have been the case in the Frank Music litigation, 229 which 
concerned a music BBS that enabled subscribers to upload, browse, and 
download digital copies of popular songs. Arguably, the operator had reason to 
believe that some uploads would be unauthorised copies and so should be held 
to be a secondary infringer for unauthorised copies found on the BBS. On the 
other hand, the kind of knowledge the BBS operator has is of a general nature; 
she or he has no suspicion about any particular uploading. 230 
A case in the United Kingdom decided prior to the new knowledge standard 
addressed the issue of whether a general knowledge of infringement will suffice. 
In Columbia Picture Industries v Robinson, 231 it was held, perhaps 
surprisingly, that the owner of a video store who had knowledge of a general 
nature that many of the video recordings in his store were probably 
unauthorised, did not have the requisite knowledge. The court reasoned 
that :232 
[a] general knowledge of the sort which Mr Robinson [the defendant] 
possessed is consistent ·with a specific video tape being a pirate tape. It 
is also consistent with a specific tape being legitimate. Unless a 
defendant has some degree of specific knowledge about a specific tape, 
his general knowledge that a tape is quite likely to be a pirate does not, 
in my judgment, fix him with knowledge sufficient for the purposes of 
section 16(3 ), that the tape was made in breach of copyright. 
The court went on to find that there was no duty on a person who sells or hires 
video tapes to check the stock of videos to avoid liability.233 This approach can 
be contrasted with that employed by the court in Moorhouse and implicit in the 
reasoning of CBS Songs, 234 that knowledge of a general kind is sufficient. It is 
likely that the new knowledge level would not require specific knowledge, and 
whether or not knowledge of this general nature will suffice in a particular 
situation will depend upon whether the knowledge was sufficient to impart a 
duty to investigate further. 
229 As mentioned above. the position was never ruled upon as the parties settled out of court. 
230 If the BBS operator did have suspicion about a particular uploading. there would 
resumably be a duty to investigate. 
31 [1987] Ch 38. 
232 Above n 231 68 
233 Above n 231 '. 68: 
234 Had the court believed that the knowledge was not sufficient due to not being of a specific 
nature, it could have dispensed with the plaintiff's claim on this ground. Instead, it found for 
the defendant due to lack of control. 
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It is submitted that the fact that a BBS is particularly susceptible to infringing 
uploads should not mean it has a duty to screen all uploadings . The 
impracticality of screening will be no less for the operator of such a BBS, and if 
the operator actually encourages infringing uploads, he or she will be caught 
under the reasoning in Sega. If collective licensing agencies become more 
common then perhaps a duty should be implied, to encourage specialist BBSs to 
contract with the relevant agency, as Myers and Hardy suggest. 235 Until this 
happens, David Dobbins' suggestion of a duty of periodic monitoring would 
appear useful. It may best serve the competing interests involved if operators 
running BBSs which are particularly susceptible to infiinging uploads have a 
duty to monitor more regularly than those which are not so susceptible. 
CONCLUSION 
Many commentators argue that copyright law, which was developed to deal 
with the print media, is unable to cope, conceptually, with digital technology 
and the Internet. 236 Several conceptual difficulties have been raised in this 
paper,237 but it appears that the existing law is able to deal, conceptually, with 
the situation at issue in this paper: the liability of BBS operators whose 
subscribers infringe copyright. It has been argued that such BBS operators 
should not be subject to the strict liability of direct infiingement, but should be 
judged against the standards of authorisation of infringement and secondary 
infiingement. This level is appropriate conceptually; when BBSs are compared 
to traditional entities; and from a policy point of view. 
BBS operators will need to warn subscribers against breaching copyright in 
order to avoid authorising infiingement. Whether BBS operators will be held to 
be secondary infiingers will depend upon whether the constructive knowledge 
standard is satisfied. To enable courts to correctly balance competing interests, 
the constructive knowledge standard should be interpreted to contain an 
element of reasonableness. Where BBS ooerators are told of or discover 
infiingements, they should be under a duty to remove them if possible, and 
235 See above, tex1 at nn 181-185. 
236 See for example Elkin-Koren n 4: JP Barlow "Selling Wine Without Bottles: the Economy 
of Mind on the Global Net" (1994) 7 Aust IPL Bull, 16: above n 3. Compare EA Cavazos & G 
Morin Cyberspace & the Law - Your Rights and Duties in the On-Line Jf'orld (MIT Press, 
Massachusetts, 1995) (arguing that current copyright law principles are able to cope adequately 
with the digital age) . 
237 See especially the discussions on the exclusive rights to copy, to show the work. and to 
issue copies of the work to the public. Above. text at nn 54-72. 
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where they refuse, copyright holders should be able to obtain injunctions forcing 
them to remove the infringing postings. Where damage is done before the 
infringing copies can be removed, liability should attach where the operator 
failed to discharge a duty to investigate. While the limits of such a duty are 
certainly debatable, it is argued that a duty of periodic monitoring would best 
recognise the reality of the nature ofBBSs, yet still provide some protection for 
copyright holders, thus maintaining the incentive to create. 
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